Publications
Publications
- February 2016
- HBS Case Collection
Debt and Democracy: The New York Constitutional Convention of 1846
By: David Moss and Dean Grodzins
Abstract
On September 23, 1846, delegates to New York State's constitutional convention prepared to vote on a proposal that its principal proponent, Michael Hoffman, conceded would be “a serious change in our form of government.” The proposal would place tight restrictions on state debt, which had increased sharply over the previous eight years. Anti-debt reformers had long agitated for such an amendment. The version presented to the convention in 1846 would place a cap on state debt of one million dollars, which could only be exceeded for two reasons: if lawmakers faced an extraordinary emergency, such as an invasion or insurrection, or—alternatively—if they (1) contracted the additional debt for a specific purpose, (2) enacted an associated tax sufficient to pay off the additional debt within 18 years, and (3) obtained approval for the tax from a majority of voters in a state-wide referendum. Critics denounced the idea of a debt-restriction amendment as unnecessary, unworkable, and subversive of republican government; they also objected that it would reverse three decades of state policy regarding “public improvements,” dating back to 1817, when New York undertook the celebrated Erie Canal. Yet popular support for a constitutional restriction on state borrowing appeared to be rising. Now, at last, the convention was about to vote on the proposal.
Keywords
Sovereign Finance; Governance; Laws and Statutes; Government and Politics; History; New York (state, US)
Citation
Moss, David, and Dean Grodzins. "Debt and Democracy: The New York Constitutional Convention of 1846." Harvard Business School Case 716-049, February 2016.