Avoiding the Costs of Negotiation: A Commentary on "Is Unilateralism Always Bad?"

James K. Sebenius

Article | Negotiation Journal

Avoiding the Costs of Negotiation: A Commentary on "Is Unilateralism Always Bad?"

Abstract

Why, if an outcome is in the interests of both sides, should it not be negotiated rather than unilaterally imposed? This comment offers additional reasons to prefer negotiation (beyond those adduced in the original article) over unilateral action, even where such action is possible. However, even outcomes in the clear interests of both sides may not be negotiable due to the costs to the negotiator, especially where important constituencies would exact high penalties for any perceived "concessions." In such cases, even substantively worse court or arbitral verdicts may be preferable for the negotiator since they are imposed rather than agreed to as the result of any weakness or concessions.

Keywords: negotiation; bargaining; Middle East; Israel; palestinians; Israel; Palestinian state;

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Citation:

Sebenius, James K. Avoiding the Costs of Negotiation: A Commentary on "Is Unilateralism Always Bad?". Negotiation Journal 30, no. 2 (April 2014): 165–168.

In 1976, a growing crisis in Southern Africa drew the attention of United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. White Rhodesian leader Ian Smith's refusal to accede to black majority rule threatened to widen into a regional conflict involving apartheid South Africa and newly independent leftist African states. Kissinger and others feared that the region was on the brink of becoming a new battleground in the Cold War. In light of these developments Kissinger decided to intervene, seeking a negotiated solution that might bring about a peaceful end to minority rule. The account in this case carefully describes—but does not analyze nor draw lessons from—these challenging circumstances.

In 1976, United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger conducted a series of intricate, multiparty negotiations in Southern Africa to persuade white Rhodesian leader Ian Smith to accede to black majority rule. Conducted near the end of President Gerald Ford’s term in office and against substantial U.S. domestic opposition, Kissinger’s efforts culminated in Smith’s public announcement that he would accept majority rule within two years. This set the stage for the later Lancaster House negotiations that resulted in the actual transition to black majority rule. The account in this case carefully describes—but does not analyze nor draw lessons from—these challenging negotiations.

A remarkable 1993 negotiation rocked the world of American football with aftershocks that have directly shaped today’s entertainment and media landscapes and even our polarized politics. In December of that year, Rupert Murdoch’s fledgling Fox Network unexpectedly displaced longtime incumbent CBS as the host of the National Football League’s flagship programming. Fox’s negotiating success seemed most unlikely given that CBS had regularly renewed these NFL rights since 1956, enjoyed a good relationship with the NFL, sported an acclaimed broadcast unit, and had affiliates in virtually all important U.S. markets. Yet acquisition of these NFL rights directly enabled the expansion of Fox, then a minor broadcaster, into the media behemoth of today. For many observers, Fox’s NFL “heist” looked like the result of a simple move: Fox offered more money than CBS. A closer analysis, however, suggests a far more complex reality with ten broader lessons for negotiators facing challenging situations.

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Avoiding the Costs of Negotiation: A Commentary on "Is Unilateralism Always Bad?"

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