Ocado

José  Alvarez; David E. Bell; Damien  McLoughlin

Case | HBS Case Collection | December 2015 (Revised February 2016)

Ocado

by José Alvarez, David E. Bell and Damien McLoughlin

Abstract

In 2015, U.K.-based Ocado was the world's largest pure player in the online home-delivery grocery business and was gaining a growing share of the highly competitive U.K. grocery market. Ocado had made heavy investments in technology, including a highly automated warehouse operation, intelligent software for efficient order delivery, and a customer-friendly online interface. Ocado's customer base had expanded beyond the wealthy to include middle-income consumers; even with a delivery charge, grocery shopping through Ocado was, in many cases, as affordable as shopping in a retail store. In 2015 the company was developing a strategy for its Smart Platform, a model in which Ocado would lease its software, hardware, and integration services to brick-and-mortar grocery retailers seeking to build online businesses. Ocado's management believed the Smart Platform, which they planned to market internationally, had the potential to disrupt the global grocery retail market.

Keywords: Ocado; grocery; retail; online grocery; supermarket; supply chain; delivery models; service models; United Kingdom; competition; technology; operations management; Market Platforms; Competition; Online Technology; Service Operations; Service Delivery; Supply Chain; Marketing; Retail Industry; Food and Beverage Industry; United Kingdom;

Language: English

Format: Print

24 pages

Educators Purchase

Citation:

Alvarez, José, David E. Bell, and Damien McLoughlin. "Ocado." Harvard Business School Case 516-059, December 2015. (Revised February 2016.)

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Case | HBS Case Collection | November 2018

Zespri Grows

David E. Bell and Natalie Kindred

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Keywords: Agribusiness; kiwi; kiwifruit; Agriculture; Global Supply Chain; branding; produce; coordinated industry structure; industry coordination; countercyclical supply; New Product Development; Product Strategy; differentiation; Food; Quality; Trade; Brands and Branding; Marketing; Strategy; Global Strategy; Change Management; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Globalization; Globalized Firms and Management; Competitive Strategy; Resource Allocation; Agriculture and Agribusiness Industry; Consumer Products Industry; Food and Beverage Industry; New Zealand;