Done but Not Published: The Dissertation Journeys of Roy J. Lewicki and J. Keith Murnighan

Shirli   Kopelman; Anne L. Lytle; Cynthia S. Wang; Roy J.  Lewicki; J.  Keith  Murnighan; Max   Bazerman

Article | Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

Done but Not Published: The Dissertation Journeys of Roy J. Lewicki and J. Keith Murnighan

by Shirli Kopelman, Anne L. Lytle, Cynthia S. Wang, Roy J. Lewicki, J. Keith Murnighan and Max Bazerman

Abstract

This article explores the tumultuous path to publication that begins for many of us with trying to publish our dissertation. We invited Roy J. Lewicki and J. Keith Murnighan—the 2013 and 2015 recipients of the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) Lifetime Achievement Award—to reflect on this process, as neither of them were successful in getting their dissertation articles published. We also asked them to reflect on the twists and turns of academic publishing, and we asked Max Bazerman to integrate these reflections. Together, we hope to spark generative conversations that will enable scholars to successfully navigate their academic careers.

Keywords: Higher Education; Research; Personal Development and Career; Business Education; Education Industry; Publishing Industry;

Format: Print

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Citation:

Kopelman, Shirli, Anne L. Lytle, Cynthia S. Wang, Roy J. Lewicki, J. Keith Murnighan, and Max Bazerman. "Done but Not Published: The Dissertation Journeys of Roy J. Lewicki and J. Keith Murnighan." Negotiation and Conflict Management Research 8, no. 4 (November 2015): 261–271.

Working Paper | 2019

Veil-of-Ignorance Reasoning Favors the Greater Good

Karen Huang, Joshua D. Greene and Max Bazerman

The “veil of ignorance” is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision-making by denying decision-makers access to potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning in a more focused way to specific moral dilemmas, all of which involve a tension between the greater good and competing moral concerns. Across six experiments (N = 5,785), three pre-registered, we find that veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good. Participants first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning about a specific dilemma, asking themselves what they would want if they did not know who among those affected they would be. Participants then responded to a more conventional version of the same dilemma with a moral judgment, a policy preference, or an economic choice. Participants who first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning subsequently made more utilitarian choices in response to a classic philosophical dilemma, a medical dilemma, a real donation decision between a more vs. less effective charity, and a policy decision concerning the social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. These effects depend on the impartial thinking induced by veil-of-ignorance reasoning and cannot be explained by a simple anchoring account, probabilistic reasoning, or generic perspective-taking. These studies indicate that veil-of-ignorance reasoning may be a useful tool for decision-makers who wish to make more impartial and/or socially beneficial choices.

Keywords: policy-making; procedural justice; Ethics; Decision Making; Fairness;

Citation:

Huang, Karen, Joshua D. Greene, and Max Bazerman. "Veil-of-Ignorance Reasoning Favors the Greater Good." Working Paper, July 2019. View Details

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Done but Not Published: The Dissertation Journeys of Roy J. Lewicki and J. Keith Murnighan

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