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• Case | HBS Case Collection | March 2019 (Revised November 2019)

  Gilead: Hepatitis C Access Strategy (A) (Abridged)

  V. Kasturi Rangan, Vikram Rangan and David E. Bloom

  Gilead had come up with an innovative drug for Hepatitis C, which affected 180 million people worldwide. The drug was priced at $1,000 a pill for the US market. Gilead had to decide how to price and market the pill in developing countries that bore the brunt of the disease. The company had earned accolades for its work in HIV/AIDS, where its innovative medicines now accounted for 60% of all patients on Anti-Retroviral (ARV) medicines. Much of this was accomplished through generic licensing, which brought a $10,000/year treatment regimen down to $100! Should the company replicate that strategy for Hepatitis C? If so, how would its US Healthcare customers, who were paying $84,000 per patient, react? On the other hand, Gilead had to balance the interests of its shareholders, who paid $11 billion for an acquisition that led to the new Hepatitis C drug.

  Keywords: healthcare; Pharmaceuticals; pricing; Access to care; Emerging Markets; Health Care and Treatment; Price; Strategy; Ethics; Health Industry; Pharmaceutical Industry;

  Citation:

  Rangan, V. Kasturi, Vikram Rangan, and David E. Bloom. "Gilead: Hepatitis C Access Strategy (A) (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 519-077, March 2019. (Revised November 2019.)  View Details

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• Supplement | HBS Case Collection | October 2019

  Gupta Media: Governors Ball Ad Spending and Ticket Sales Data

  V. Kasturi Rangan and Courtney Han

  Citation:

  Rangan, V. Kasturi, and Courtney Han. "Gupta Media: Governors Ball Ad Spending and Ticket Sales Data." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 520-706, October 2019.  View Details

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• Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2019

  Shareholder Activism and Firms' Voluntary Disclosure of Climate Change Risks

  Caroline Flammer, Michael W. Toffel and Kala Viswanathan

  This paper examines whether—in the absence of mandated disclosure requirements—shareholder activism can elicit greater disclosure of firms’ exposure to climate change risks. We find that environmental shareholder activism increases the voluntary disclosure of climate change risks, especially if initiated by investors who are more powerful (institutional investors) or whose request has more legitimacy (long-term institutional investors). We also find that companies that voluntarily disclose climate change risks following environmental shareholder activism achieve a higher valuation, suggesting that investors value transparency with respect to climate change risks.

  Keywords: Corporate Accountability; Corporate Disclosure; Corporate Social Responsibility and Impact; Business and Shareholder Relations; Risk and Uncertainty; Natural Environment; Environmental Sustainability; Weather and Climate Change; Financial Services Industry; United States;

  Citation:

  Flammer, Caroline, Michael W. Toffel, and Kala Viswanathan. "Shareholder Activism and Firms' Voluntary Disclosure of Climate Change Risks." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-049, October 2019.  View Details

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