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Article Review of Accounting Studies September 2015 Speaking of the Short-Term: Disclosure Horizon and Managerial Myopia |
We study conference calls as a voluntary disclosure channel and create a proxy for the time horizon that senior executives emphasize in their communications. We find that our measure of disclosure time horizon is associated with capital market pressures and executives' short-term monetary incentives. Consistent with the language emphasized during conference calls partially capturing short-termism, we show that our proxy is associated with earnings and real activities management. Overall, the results show that the time horizon of conference call narratives can be informative about managers' myopic behavior.
Keywords: Short-termism; management styles; disclosure; conference calls; Investing; earnings management; Motivation and Incentives; Management Style; Forms of Communication;
Brochet, Francois, Maria Loumioti, and George Serafeim. "Speaking of the Short-Term: Disclosure Horizon and Managerial Myopia." Review of Accounting Studies 20, no. 3 (September 2015): 1122–1163.
