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  • 2015
  • Article
  • Academy of Management Proceedings

Regulator Leniency and Mispricing in Beneficent Nonprofits

By: Jonas Heese, Ranjani Krishnan and Frank Moers
  • Format:Electronic
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Abstract

We posit that nonprofits that provide a greater supply of unprofitable services (beneficent nonprofits) face lenient regulatory enforcement for mispricing in price-regulated markets. Consequently, beneficent nonprofits exploit such regulatory leniency and exhibit higher mispricing. Drawing on organizational legitimacy theory, we argue that both regulators and beneficent nonprofits seek to protect their legitimacy with stakeholders, including those who demand access to unprofitable services. Using data from hospitals, we examine mispricing via "upcoding", which involves misclassifying ailment severity. Archival analysis indicates less stringent regulatory enforcement of upcoding for beneficent nonprofit hospitals, defined as hospitals that provide higher charity care and medical education. After observing regulator leniency, beneficent hospitals demonstrate higher upcoding. Our results suggest that lenient enforcement assists beneficent nonprofits to obtain higher revenues in price-regulated markets.

Keywords

Nonprofit Organizations; Business Earnings; Fairness; Governance Compliance

Citation

Heese, Jonas, Ranjani Krishnan, and Frank Moers. "Regulator Leniency and Mispricing in Beneficent Nonprofits." Art. 11998. Academy of Management Proceedings (2015).

About The Author

Jonas Heese

Accounting and Management
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  • “GEnron?” Markopolos versus General Electric (A) By: Jonas Heese and David Lane
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  • Was sich nach dem Wirecard-Skandal ändern muss By: Jonas Heese and Karthik Ramanna
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