The Multinational Firm and Geopolitics: Europe, Russian Energy, and Power

Rawi  Abdelal

Article | Business and Politics | October 2015

The Multinational Firm and Geopolitics: Europe, Russian Energy, and Power

Abstract

Multinational firms unavoidably exert influence over politics through power that is generated by both structure and process. While both political economy and management scholars address international firms, neither field has an adequate understanding of the reciprocal relationship between multinational firms and geopolitical systems. The links between multinational firms form a distinct type of international system for the private sector—one that is simultaneously enmeshed in geopolitics and international markets even as it is also autonomous from them. The scholarly literature on the power of business in politics has demonstrated how influence derives from instrumental agency as well as structural influence, but it has taken an unnecessarily restrictive view of politics and an overly materialist theory of power. Politics are about much more than government policies. In this paper I propose an analytical framework for understanding the multinational firm as a set of relationships. I then apply one key element of that approach—the relationships among firms as a direct source of geopolitical outcomes—to the natural gas trade of Eurasia in three eras that span nearly 40 years. I conclude that the influence of business on a broader understanding of politics—and not just policies—should be central to the study of international and comparative political economy.

Keywords: Multinational Firms and Management; Government and Politics; Economics;

Format: Print

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Abdelal, Rawi. "The Multinational Firm and Geopolitics: Europe, Russian Energy, and Power." Business and Politics 17, no. 3 (October 2015): 553–576.

Proposed in 2012, Nord Stream 2 was a pipeline project that aimed to bring natural gas directly from Russia to Europe beneath the Baltic Sea. Gazprom, an energy company with deep ties to the Russian state, hoped to manage the project in association with a consortium of European companies. The pipeline appeared to be a rational investment for these companies, many of whom had working relationships with Gazprom. However, some European voices argued that the project went against the European Union’s security and foreign policy goals. Nord Stream 2 would allow Gazprom to bypass Ukraine as a gas transit country, threatening Ukraine’s economy and energy security. The European Union attempted to influence the project through new, supranational regulations meant to uphold transparency and competition in European gas markets. The beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 significantly upped the stakes for Nord Stream 2, as some began to question Europe’s ability to meaningfully take action in the face of kinetic provocation. It was unclear whether pro- or anti-Nord Stream 2 actors would emerge successful, in a battle of wills that would have resonating consequences for Russia’s economy, the European Union’s legitimacy, and the emerging multipolar world order at large.

Supplement | HBS Case Collection | March 2019

Profits, Politics, and Pipelines: Europe, Russia, and the Challenge of Nord Stream 2 (B)

Rawi Abdelal, Galit Goldstein, Cressida Arkwright and Khilola Zakhidova

Nord Stream 2, a pipeline project that aimed to bring natural gas directly from Russia to Europe beneath the Baltic Sea, was a critical project for Gazprom, an energy company with deep ties to the Russian state. Proposed in 2012, contention around Nord Stream 2 intensified into the end of the Obama era and the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency. As European-Russian relations grew more complex in the wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, assassination attempts and apparent state-sponsored online information operations activities, Nord Stream 2’s opponents asserted that the pipeline represented Russia’s increasing influence over European affairs. However, the project maintained support both in the private sector and in key European Union member states. At a critical juncture in Nord Stream 2’s development, the EU’s legal capacity to exert influence over the energy sector came into question, while the Trump administration threatened to sanction European companies involved with the pipeline. Questions swirled around Nord Stream 2 going into 2019: had the pipeline illuminated cracks in the transatlantic relationship and the European Union as an institution? Was Nord Stream 2 a rational investment, or a political project? Would Nord Stream 2 ultimately be completed as planned?

Keywords: NaturalGas; Gas Pipelines; Nord Stream 2; Nord Stream; Russia; United States; EuropeanUnion; Europe; Germany; Poland; Ukraine; geopolitics; Strategic Analysis; strategic behavior; Public Diplomacy; government and business; Government andPolitics; energy; Energy Entrepreneurship; Energy Industry; Energy Management; energy policy; energy markets; energy transmission; Analysis; Business Ventures; Trade; Energy; Energy Sources; Non-Renewable Energy; Geography; Geographic Location; Geographic Scope; Global Range; Geopolitical Units; Country; Globalization; Cross-Cultural and Cross-Border Issues; Global Strategy; Globalized Economies and Regions; Globalized Firms and Management; Globalized Markets and Industries; Government and Politics; Government Legislation; International Relations; National Security; Growth and Development Strategy; Problems and Challenges; Relationships; Alliances; Business and Government Relations; Business and Shareholder Relations; Risk and Uncertainty; Strategy; Business Strategy; Competition; Society; Public Opinion; War; Energy Industry; Utilities Industry; Asia; Russia; Europe; Germany; Poland; North and Central America; North America; United States;

Citation:

Abdelal, Rawi, Galit Goldstein, Cressida Arkwright, and Khilola Zakhidova. "Profits, Politics, and Pipelines: Europe, Russia, and the Challenge of Nord Stream 2 (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 719-062, March 2019. View Details

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Italy’s March 2018 elections led to a populist government which included the right-wing League and the anti-establishment 5 Star Movement. To respect their electoral promises, the two parties came up with a budget plan which provided for a public deficit at 2.4%, a figure higher than what the previous administration had promised the EU Commission. On October 23, 2018, the EU Commission rejected such plan asking Italy to revise downwards the public deficit. The same day, Italian bond yields spoke to 4-year highs, up to 3.7% as investors questioned Italy’s capacity to repay its public long-term debt, the second highest in the EU. Would the Italian government be able to implement its plan?

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The Multinational Firm and Geopolitics: Europe, Russian Energy, and Power

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