Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis in Italy

Dante  Roscini

Article | Journal of Modern Italian Studies | 2014

Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis in Italy

Abstract

The financial crisis hit Italy harder than many other Eurozone countries. In part this was due to the fact that the crisis came upon a system that was weakened by years of sub-par economic growth. One of the several endogenous factors that explain the stagnation of the Italian economy is the weak corporate governance in the industrial sector and parts of the financial one. A framework that was designed to maintain stability in the ownership of companies and of certain types of banking institutions ultimately led to an inefficient allocation of capital and to a lack of investment, which contributed to the loss of competitiveness of Italian firms in a fast globalizing marketplace.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Financial Crisis; Italy;

Format: Print

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Roscini, Dante. "Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis in Italy." Journal of Modern Italian Studies 19, no. 4 (2014): 389–395.

After its 2009-2010 fiscal crisis shook the euro, could the Greek government stabilize debt, avoid default, and stay on the euro? This case looks at the Greek social and political road to fiscal crisis; the economics of that crisis and efforts to recover from it; the danger the crisis posed to the euro; cooperation and conflict among European states, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund to try to help Greece emerge from crisis; and the role financial markets played in these events.

Case | HBS Case Collection | August 2016 (Revised July 2017)

Diageo and Mey Icki: Turkish Delight or Turkish Hangover?

Dante Roscini and Gamze Yucaoglu

In September 2013, two years after its $2.1 billion acquisition of Mey Icki Sanayi ve Ticaret AS (Mey Icki), the principal spirits company in Turkey specializing in the local beverage, raki, Diageo, the world’s leading premium drinks company, was concerned about new legislation approved by the Turkish parliament prohibiting marketing and restricting the places and times at which alcoholic beverages could be sold. Diageo’s Mey Icki investment in 2011 was the company’s biggest acquisition in more than a decade. Having been caught off guard by the 2013 legislative changes, the Diageo management found itself needing to justify its $2.1 billion valuation, given that Diageo had acquired Mey Icki in 2011 from TPG for three times TPG's purchase price in 2006. Investors as well as analysts were questioning the over seven times value increase in Mey Icki since its privatization in 2003. Menezes, new to the CEO post, found himself increasingly overwhelmed by these issues. Had Diageo underestimated the uncertainties in the Turkish market? Would Diageo, with its broad range of brands, geographical spread, and significant financial resources be able to adapt to the changing environment and recoup its vast investment in Turkey? The case describes the forces that affect investment circumstances in emerging markets, raising the issue of how to best manage and prepare for risks. The case provides the context for the students to identify the potential elements that companies could face when investing in emerging markets where rules, legislation, and taxation can change and thus affect investment outcomes. The case challenges the students to ponder what companies should think about when investing in volatile markets and what it takes for them to succeed under uncertain and shifting circumstances.

Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; Emerging Markets; Government Legislation; Taxation; Valuation; Business and Government Relations; Government and Politics; Risk Management; Retail Industry; Food and Beverage Industry; Middle East; Turkey;

Citation:

Roscini, Dante, and Gamze Yucaoglu. "Diageo and Mey Icki: Turkish Delight or Turkish Hangover?" Harvard Business School Case 717-005, August 2016. (Revised July 2017.) View Details

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Petrom was privatized by the Romanian state in 2004 and acquired by Austrian oil company OMV, with the state retaining a 20.6% stake in the company. The situation was particularly challenging for the foreign investor since the sector in which the company operated was strategic, was regulated by the Romanian state and the company was a key employer and tax payer in a country that was undergoing major structural change. Under OMV and CEO Mariana Gheorghe's leadership, OMV Petrom saw its net profit and sales almost double since 2005, while headcount was reduced by 50%. Gheorghe had negotiated challenges stemming from Petrom's legacy as a state-owned company, such as lack of investment, aged assets, operational inefficiency, and bureaucracy while successfully managing the triangular partnership between the acquirer OMV, acquiree OMV Petrom and the Romanian government.

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Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis in Italy

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