Article
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Strategic Disclosure: The Case of Business School Rankings

By: Michael Luca and Jonathan Smith

Format:Print

Abstract

We empirically analyze disclosure decisions made by 240 MBA programs about which rankings to display on their websites. We present three main findings. First, consistent with theories of countersignaling, top schools are least likely to disclose their rankings, whereas mid-ranked schools are most likely to disclose. Second, schools that do poorly in the U.S. News rankings are more likely to disclose their Princeton Review certification, suggesting that schools treat different certifications as substitutes. Third, conditional on displaying a ranking, the majority of schools coarsen information to make it seem more favorable. The stark patterns in the data help to provide empirical evidence on the strategic elements of voluntary disclosure and marketing decisions.

Keywords

Voluntary Disclosure; Shrouded Attributes; Information Unraveling; Rankings; Higher Education; Corporate Disclosure; Rank and Position

Citation

Luca, Michael, and Jonathan Smith. "Strategic Disclosure: The Case of Business School Rankings." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (April 2015): 17–25.