More from these Authors

• Article | Journal of Accounting Research | March 2020

  The Politics of M&A Antitrust

  Mihir N. Mehta, Suraj Srinivasan and Wanli Zhao

  Antitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition. We examine whether firms can use the political process to opportunistically influence antitrust reviews of corporate merger transactions. We exploit the fact that in some mergers, acquirers and/or targets are connected to powerful U.S. politicians that serve on the two congressional committees with antitrust regulator oversight. We find that merger parties with these connections receive relatively favorable antitrust review outcomes. To establish a causal link, we use plausibly exogenous shocks to firm-politician links and a falsification test. Politician incentives to influence merger antitrust review outcomes appear to be driven by lobbying, contributions, and prior business connections. In sum, our findings suggest that political interference affects the ability of antitrust regulators to provide independent recommendations about the anti-competitive effects of mergers.

  Keywords: political economy; antitrust; FTC; DOJ; Mergers and Acquisitions; Government and Politics; Power and Influence;

  Citation:

  Mehta, Mihir N., Suraj Srinivasan, and Wanli Zhao. "The Politics of M&A Antitrust." Journal of Accounting Research 58, no. 1 (March 2020): 5–53. (Previously circulated under title "Political Influence and Merger Antitrust Reviews.")  View Details

  CiteView DetailsSSRNFind at Harvard

  Related

• Article | Journal of Financial Economics | March 2020

  Governance Through Shame and Aspiration: Index Creation and Corporate Behavior

  Akash Chattopadhyay, Matthew D. Shaffer and Charles C.Y. Wang

  After decades of deprioritizing shareholders' economic interests and low corporate profitability, Japan introduced the JPX-Nikkei400 in 2014. The index highlighted the country's "best-run" companies by annually selecting the 400 most profitable of its large and liquid firms. We find that managers competed for inclusion in the index by significantly increasing ROE, and they did so at least in part due to their reputational or status concerns. The ROE increase was predominantly driven by improvements in margins, which were in turn partially driven by cutting R&D intensity. Our findings suggest that indexes can affect managerial behavior through reputational or status incentives.

  Keywords: JPX-Nikkei 400 index; Status incentives; return on equity; capital efficiency; Social Norms; Index inclusion; Reputation incentives; Motivation and Incentives; Corporate Governance; Behavior; Investment Return; Status and Position; Japan;

  Citation:

  Chattopadhyay, Akash, Matthew D. Shaffer, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "Governance Through Shame and Aspiration: Index Creation and Corporate Behavior." Journal of Financial Economics 135, no. 3 (March 2020): 704–724.  View Details

  CiteView DetailsSSRNFind at Harvard Read Now

  Related

• Case | HBS Case Collection | April 2018 (Revised January 2020)

  Tesla's CEO Compensation Plan

  Krishna G. Palepu and Sarah Mehta

  Tesla’s board of directors proposed an unusual compensation plan for the company’s CEO Elon Musk. The plan payouts were entirely contingent on achieving very ambitious market value, sales, and EBIT targets over the next ten years. If all the targets were achieved, Tesla would be one of the most valuable companies in the world, and Musk would receive the highest compensation of any CEO in U.S. corporate history. If the targets were not achieved, Musk would receive nothing. Proxy advisors (ISS and Glass Lewis) expressed serious reservations about the plan and urged shareholders to vote against it. Should shareholders approve or reject the plan?

  Keywords: CEO compensation; compensation committee; Corporate Governance; Executive Compensation; Governing and Advisory Boards; Business and Shareholder Relations; Auto Industry; United States;

  Citation:

  Palepu, Krishna G., and Sarah Mehta. "Tesla's CEO Compensation Plan." Harvard Business School Case 118-085, April 2018. (Revised January 2020.)  View Details

  CiteView DetailsEducatorsPurchase

  Related