Vulnerable Banks

Robin  Greenwood; Augustin  Landier; David  Thesmar

Article | Journal of Financial Economics | March 2015

Vulnerable Banks

by Robin Greenwood, Augustin Landier and David Thesmar

Abstract

We present a model in which fire sales propagate shocks across bank balance sheets. When a bank experiences a negative shock to its equity, a natural way to return to target leverage is to sell assets. If potential buyers are limited, then asset sales depress prices, in which case one bank's sales impact other banks with common exposures. We show how this contagion effect adds up across the banking sector, and how it can be estimated empirically using balance sheet data. We compute bank exposures to system-wide deleveraging, as well as the spillovers induced by individual banks. Applying the model to European banks, we evaluate a variety of interventions to reduce their vulnerability to fire sales during the sovereign debt crisis.

Keywords: Financial Liquidity; Financial Crisis; Banks and Banking; Banking Industry; Europe;

Format: Print

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Citation:

Greenwood, Robin, Augustin Landier, and David Thesmar. "Vulnerable Banks." Journal of Financial Economics 115, no. 3 (March 2015): 471–485.

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In February and March 2009, the U.S. economy was in the midst of a terrifying financial and economic crisis. Between the beginning of 2008 and early 2009, four of the 25 largest U.S. financial institutions had failed, and nine of these 25 institutions had taken extraordinary steps to avoid failure—either receiving one-off government support, merging with another firm, or submitting to heightened regulation to qualify for future government support. Led by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, the government had to quickly devise policies to stabilize the financial system and the economy. The case explores the details of policies, and the decision making process that led to them, that Geithner and his team devised under immense time pressure to stabilize the system. The case features an extended discussion of Geithner’s innovative “stress test,” which would reveal the longer-term health of the country’s largest banks.

We evaluate Eugene Fama's claim that stock prices do not exhibit price bubbles. Based on U.S. industry returns 1926–2014 and international sector returns 1985–2014, we present four findings: (1) Fama is correct in that a sharp price increase of an industry portfolio does not, on average, predict unusually low returns going forward; (2) such sharp price increases predict a substantially heightened probability of a crash; (3) attributes of the price run-up, including volatility, turnover, issuance, and the price path of the run-up, can all help forecast an eventual crash and future returns; and (4) some of these characteristics can help investors earn superior returns by timing the bubble. Results hold similarly in U.S. and international samples.

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Vulnerable Banks

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