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• Chapter | The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship and Collaboration | 2019

  Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates

  Ramana Nanda and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf

  An extensive literature on venture capital has studied asymmetric information and agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs, examining how separating entrepreneurs from the investor can create frictions that might inhibit the funding of good projects. It has largely abstracted away from the fact that a startup typically does not have just one investor, but several VCs that come together in a syndicate to finance a venture. In this chapter, we therefore argue for an expansion of the standard perspective to also include frictions within VC syndicates. Put differently, what are the frictions that arise from the fact that there is not just one investor for each venture but several investors with different incentives, objectives, and cash flow rights who nevertheless need to collaborate to help make the venture a success? We outline the ways in which these coordination frictions manifest themselves, describe the underlying drivers, and document several contractual solutions used by VCs to mitigate their effects. We believe that this broader perspective provides several promising avenues for future research.

  Keywords: Syndication; Venture Capital; Networks; Entrepreneurship;

  Citation:

  Nanda, Ramana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates." In The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship and Collaboration, edited by Jeffrey J. Reuer, Sharon Matusik, and Jessica F. Jones. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.  View Details

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• Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2019

  Infrastructure and Finance: Evidence from India's GQ Highway Network

  Abhiman Das, Ejaz Ghani, Arti Grover, William R. Kerr and Ramana Nanda

  We use the construction of India's Golden Quadrangle (GQ) central highway network, together with comprehensive loan data drawn from the Reserve Bank of India, to investigate the interaction between infrastructure development and financial sector depth. We identify a disproportionate increase in loan count and average loan size in districts along the GQ highway network using stringent specifications with industry and district fixed effects. Our results hold in straight-line IV frameworks and are not present in “placebo tests” with another highway that was planned to be upgraded at the same time as GQ but subsequently delayed. Importantly, however, results are concentrated in districts with stronger initial financial development, suggesting that while financing does respond to large infrastructure investments and help spur real economic outcomes, initial financial sector development might play an important role in determining where real activity will grow.

  Keywords: Infrastructure; Financing and Loans; India;

  Citation:

  Das, Abhiman, Ejaz Ghani, Arti Grover, William R. Kerr, and Ramana Nanda. "Infrastructure and Finance: Evidence from India's GQ Highway Network." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-121, June 2019.  View Details

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• Case | HBS Case Collection | November 2018 (Revised June 2019)

  CleanWater, Inc.: Running Dry & Out of Time

  Ramana Nanda, Robert F. White, Shai Bernstein and James Barnett

  Citation:

  Nanda, Ramana, Robert F. White, Shai Bernstein, and James Barnett. "CleanWater, Inc.: Running Dry & Out of Time." Harvard Business School Case 819-016, November 2018. (Revised June 2019.)  View Details

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