Using Implementation Intentions Prompts to Enhance Influenza Vaccination Rates

Katherine L Milkman; John  Beshears; James J. Choi; David  Laibson; Brigitte C. Madrian

Article | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | June 28, 2011

Using Implementation Intentions Prompts to Enhance Influenza Vaccination Rates

by Katherine L Milkman, John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson and Brigitte C. Madrian

Abstract

We evaluate the results of a field experiment designed to measure the effect of prompts to form implementation intentions on realized behavioral outcomes. The outcome of interest is influenza vaccination receipt at free on-site clinics offered by a large firm to its employees. All employees eligible for study participation received reminder mailings that listed the times and locations of the relevant vaccination clinics. Mailings to employees randomly assigned to the treatment conditions additionally included a prompt to write down either (i) the date the employee planned to be vaccinated or (ii) the date and time the employee planned to be vaccinated. Vaccination rates increased when these implementation intentions prompts were included in the mailing. The vaccination rate among control condition employees was 33.1%. Employees who received the prompt to write down just a date had a vaccination rate 1.5 percentage points higher than the control group, a difference that is not statistically significant. Employees who received the more specific prompt to write down both a date and a time had a 4.2 percentage point higher vaccination rate, a difference that is both statistically significant and of meaningful magnitude.

Keywords: Behavioral economics; nudge; libertarian paternalism; public health; flu shot; Behavior; Consumer Behavior; Health Care and Treatment; Cognition and Thinking;

Format: Print

Read Now

Citation:

Milkman, Katherine L., John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian. "Using Implementation Intentions Prompts to Enhance Influenza Vaccination Rates." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108, no. 26 (June 28, 2011): 10415–10420.

Can a “set your own salary” system boost employee happiness and motivation? Spiber made synthetic silk built from proteins mimicking the proteins found in spider silk, the world’s toughest known material by weight. Kazuhide Sekiyama and Junichi Sugahara established Spiber to create protein materials that would eventually compete effectively with petrochemical-based materials widely used in apparel, auto parts, and airplane components, among many other applications. From the beginning, they envisioned a team built on mutual respect and a common purpose. The executive team wanted the company’s compensation system to match the organization’s values. Thus, the company had implemented a unique salary-setting process designed to inspire autonomy and responsibility among employees: each employee retained the ultimate authority to choose his or her own salary. The members of the executive team were excited about the “set your own salary” system, but was it having the intended effect?

Article | Journal of Public Economics | March 2020

Which Early Withdrawal Penalty Attracts the Most Deposits to a Commitment Savings Account?

John Beshears, James J. Choi, Christopher Harris, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian and Jung Sakong

Previous research has shown that some people voluntarily use commitment contracts that restrict their own choice sets. We study how people divide money between two accounts: a liquid account that permits unrestricted withdrawals and a commitment account that is randomly assigned in a between-subject design to have either a 10% early withdrawal penalty, or a 20% early withdrawal penalty, or not to allow early withdrawals at all (i.e., an infinite penalty). When the liquid account and the commitment account pay the same interest rate, higher early withdrawal penalties attract more commitment account deposits. This pattern is predicted by the hypothesis that some participants are partially or fully sophisticated present-biased agents. Such agents perceive that higher penalties generate greater scope for commitment by disincentivizing (penalized) early withdrawals. The experiment also shows that when the commitment account pays a higher interest rate than the liquid account, the positive empirical slope relating penalties and commitment deposits is flattened, suggesting that naïve present-biased agents or agents with standard exponential discounting are also in our sample. Across all of our experimental treatments, higher early withdrawal penalties on the commitment account sometimes increase and never reduce allocations to the commitment account.

Keywords: quasi-hyperbolic discounting; present bias; sophistication; naiveté; commitment; Flexibility; savings; Contract Design; defined contribution retirement plan; 401 (k); IRA; Saving; Behavior; Contracts; Design; Interest Rates;

Citation:

Beshears, John, James J. Choi, Christopher Harris, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Jung Sakong. "Which Early Withdrawal Penalty Attracts the Most Deposits to a Commitment Savings Account?" Art. 104144. Journal of Public Economics 183 (March 2020). View Details

Cite View Details Find at Harvard Read Now

Faculty & Research

Using Implementation Intentions Prompts to Enhance Influenza Vaccination Rates

Abstract

Citation:

About the Author

More from the Author