Article
Journal of Labor Economics

Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives

By: Oriana Bandiera, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat and Raffaella Sadun

Format:Print

Abstract

We combine unique administrative and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data include manager characteristics, firm characteristics, detailed measures of managerial practices, and outcomes for the firm and the manager. A parsimonious model of matching and incentives generates implications that we test with our data. We use the model to illustrate how risk aversion and talent determine how firms select and motivate managers. We show that empirical links between firm governance, incentives, and performance, which have so far been studied in isolation, can instead all be interpreted within our simple unified matching framework.

Keywords

Motivation and Incentives; Talent and Talent Management; Organizations; Management Teams

Citation

Bandiera, Oriana, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives." Journal of Labor Economics 33, no. 3 (July 2015): 623–681.