Publications
Publications
- December 2013
- Journal of Financial Economics
How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
By: Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
Abstract
The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms' greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the causal question using a natural experiment involving two Delaware court rulings―separated by several weeks and going in opposite directions―that affected the antitakeover force of SBs. We contribute to the long-standing debate on staggered boards by documenting empirical evidence consistent with the market viewing SBs as leading to lower firm value for the affected firms.
Keywords
Staggered Board; Takeover Defense; Antitakeover Provision; Proxy Fight; Tobin's; Firm Value; Agency Cost; Delaware; Chancery Court; Airgas; Governing and Advisory Boards; Corporate Governance
Citation
Cohen, Alma, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment." Journal of Financial Economics 110, no. 3 (December 2013): 627–641.