Economics Education and Greed

Long  Wang; Deepak  Malhotra; J.  Keith  Murnighan

Article | Academy of Management Learning & Education | December 2011

Economics Education and Greed

by Long Wang, Deepak Malhotra and J. Keith Murnighan

Abstract

The recent financial crisis, and repeated corporate scandals, raise serious questions about whether a business school education contributes to what some have described as a culture of greed. The dominance of economic-related courses in MBA curricula led us to assess the effects of economics education on greed in three studies using multiple methods. Study 1 found that economics majors and students who had taken multiple economics courses kept more money in a money allocation task (the Dictator Game). Study 2 found that economics education was associated with more positive attitudes toward greed and toward one's own greedy behavior. Study 3 found that a short statement on the societal benefits of self-interest led to more positive ratings of greed's moral acceptability, even for noneconomics students. These effects suggest that economics education may have serious, albeit unintended consequences on our students' attitudes toward greed.

Keywords: Behavior; Ethics; Attitudes; Business Education; Economics;

Format: Print

Find at Harvard

Citation:

Wang, Long, Deepak Malhotra, and J. Keith Murnighan. "Economics Education and Greed." Academy of Management Learning & Education 10, no. 4 (December 2011): 643–660.

Handgun waiting periods are laws that impose a delay between the initiation of a purchase and final acquisition of a firearm. We show that waiting periods, which create a “cooling off” period among buyers, significantly reduce the incidence of gun violence. We estimate the impact of waiting periods on gun deaths, exploiting all changes to state-level policies in the Unites States since 1970. We find that waiting periods reduce gun homicides by roughly 17%. We provide further support for the causal impact of waiting periods on homicides by exploiting a natural experiment resulting from a federal law in 1994 that imposed a temporary waiting period on a subset of states.

A two-party negotiation between an Agent representing a new author and an Editor at a large Publishing Firm. The exercise involves a one-issue, zero-sum negotiation concerning the advance on royalties that the publisher will pay to the author.

Faculty & Research

Economics Education and Greed

Abstract

Citation:

About the Author

More from the Author