Level Two Negotiations

James K. Sebenius

Article | Negotiation Journal | January 2013

Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its 'Behind-the-Table' Challenges

Abstract

A long analytic tradition has explored the challenge of productively synchronizing "internal" with "external" negotiations, with a special focus on how each side can best manage internal opposition to agreements negotiated "at the table." Implicit in much of this work has been the view that each side's leadership is best positioned to manage its own internal conflicts, often by pressing for deal terms that will overcome internal objections and by effectively "selling" the agreement to key constituencies. Far less frequently have analysts considered how each side—to further its own goals—can help the other side with the other's "behind-the-table" barriers to successful agreement. Following Robert Putnam's (1988) two-level games schema, I characterize such "behind the table," or "Level Two,' barriers more broadly, offer several innovative private and public sector examples of how each side can help the other overcome them, and develop more general advice on doing so most effectively. As a fuller illustration of a Level Two negotiator helping the other side with its formidable behind-the-table challenges, I pay special attention to the end-of-Cold-War negotiations over German reunification in which former United States Secretary of State James Baker played a key role.

Keywords: negotiation; James Baker; internal negotiation; dispute resolution; bargaining; Two-level games; Negotiation; Germany; United States;

Format: Print

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Citation:

Sebenius, James K. "Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its 'Behind-the-Table' Challenges." Negotiation Journal 29, no. 1 (January 2013): 7–21.

In 1976, a growing crisis in Southern Africa drew the attention of United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. White Rhodesian leader Ian Smith's refusal to accede to black majority rule threatened to widen into a regional conflict involving apartheid South Africa and newly independent leftist African states. Kissinger and others feared that the region was on the brink of becoming a new battleground in the Cold War. In light of these developments Kissinger decided to intervene, seeking a negotiated solution that might bring about a peaceful end to minority rule. The account in this case carefully describes—but does not analyze nor draw lessons from—these challenging circumstances.

In 1976, United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger conducted a series of intricate, multiparty negotiations in Southern Africa to persuade white Rhodesian leader Ian Smith to accede to black majority rule. Conducted near the end of President Gerald Ford’s term in office and against substantial U.S. domestic opposition, Kissinger’s efforts culminated in Smith’s public announcement that he would accept majority rule within two years. This set the stage for the later Lancaster House negotiations that resulted in the actual transition to black majority rule. The account in this case carefully describes—but does not analyze nor draw lessons from—these challenging negotiations.

A remarkable 1993 negotiation rocked the world of American football with aftershocks that have directly shaped today’s entertainment and media landscapes and even our polarized politics. In December of that year, Rupert Murdoch’s fledgling Fox Network unexpectedly displaced longtime incumbent CBS as the host of the National Football League’s flagship programming. Fox’s negotiating success seemed most unlikely given that CBS had regularly renewed these NFL rights since 1956, enjoyed a good relationship with the NFL, sported an acclaimed broadcast unit, and had affiliates in virtually all important U.S. markets. Yet acquisition of these NFL rights directly enabled the expansion of Fox, then a minor broadcaster, into the media behemoth of today. For many observers, Fox’s NFL “heist” looked like the result of a simple move: Fox offered more money than CBS. A closer analysis, however, suggests a far more complex reality with ten broader lessons for negotiators facing challenging situations.

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Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its 'Behind-the-Table' Challenges

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