Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Financial Statement Comparability

Francois  Brochet; Alan  Jagolinzer; Edward J. Riedl

Article | Contemporary Accounting Research | Winter 2013

Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Financial Statement Comparability

by Francois Brochet, Alan Jagolinzer and Edward J. Riedl

Abstract

This study examines whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) leads to capital market benefits through enhanced financial statement comparability. UK domestic standards are considered very similar to IFRS (Bae et al., 2008), suggesting any capital market benefits observed for UK-domiciled firms are more likely attributable to improvements in comparability (i.e., better precision of across-firm information) than to changes in information quality specific to the firm (i.e., core information quality). If IFRS adoption improves financial statement comparability, we predict this should reduce insiders' ability to benefit from private information. Consistent with these expectations, we find that abnormal returns to insider purchases—used to proxy for private information—are reduced following IFRS adoption. Similar results are derived across numerous subsamples and proxies used to isolate IFRS effects attributable to comparability. Together, the findings are consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption improving comparability and thus leading to capital market benefits by reducing insiders' ability to exploit private information.

Keywords: IFRS; comparability; private information; insider trading; Ethics; Standards; Financial Statements;

Format: Print

52 pages

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Citation:

Brochet, Francois, Alan Jagolinzer, and Edward J. Riedl. "Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Financial Statement Comparability." Contemporary Accounting Research 30, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 1373–1400.

In autumn 2011, Netflix was working to right the ship after publicly stumbling through a price hike and strategic shift and then retreat. The company was changing its business model to focus on streaming video service rather than the DVDs by mail that had brought the company success and praise. One important wrinkle in this business model shift came in the accounting of streaming content. The case describes the rule, FAS 63, that Netflix used to account for streaming content and the implications for the future of the company that could be attributed to this accounting shift.

We examine how language barriers affect the capital market reaction to information disclosures. Using transcripts from the English-language conference calls of non-U.S. firms, we find that the calls of firms in countries with greater language barriers are more likely to contain non-plain English and erroneous expressions. For non-U.S. firms that hire an English-speaking manager, we find less use of non-plain English and fewer erroneous expressions. Calls that have greater use of non-plain English and more erroneous expressions show lower intraday price movement and trading volume. The capital market responses to non-plain English and erroneous expressions are more negative when the firm is located in a non-English-speaking country and has more English-speaking analysts participating in the call. Our results highlight that when disclosure takes the form of verbal communication, language barriers between speaker and listener affect the transparency of the narrative which in turn impacts the market reaction to the disclosure.

Article | Accounting Review | March 2014

Do Analysts Follow Managers Who Switch Companies? An Analysis of Relationships in the Capital Markets

Francois Brochet, Gregory S. Miller and Suraj Srinivasan

We examine the importance of professional relationships developed between analysts and managers by investigating analyst coverage decisions in the context of CEO and CFO moves between publicly listed firms. We find that top executive moves from an origin firm to a destination firm trigger analysts following the origin firm to initiate coverage of the destination firm in 10% of our sample, which is significantly higher than in a matched sample. Analyst-manager "co-migration" is significantly stronger when both firms are within the same industry. Analysts who move with managers to the destination firm exhibit more intense and accurate coverage of the origin firm than they do in other firms and compared to other analysts covering the origin firm. The advantage no longer holds after the executive's departure, and most of the analysts' advantage does not carry over to the destination firm. However, the analysts do increase the overall market capitalization of firms in their coverage portfolio. Our results hold after Regulation Fair Disclosure, suggesting that these relationships are not based on selective disclosure. Overall, the evidence shows both the importance and limitations of professional relations in capital markets.

Keywords: management turnover; analyst coverage; capital market relationships; Capital Markets; Relationships;

Citation:

Brochet, Francois, Gregory S. Miller, and Suraj Srinivasan. "Do Analysts Follow Managers Who Switch Companies? An Analysis of Relationships in the Capital Markets." Accounting Review 89, no. 2 (March 2014). View Details

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Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Financial Statement Comparability

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