H-Soft Mumbai

Ramana  Nanda

Case | HBS Case Collection | May 2012 (Revised October 2012)

H-Soft Mumbai

Abstract

Siddharth Kapoor, the Founder and CEO of H-Soft Mumbai reflected on his meeting as he walked out of VC Ventures' offices in Mumbai. After a few months of intensely pitching his startup to several different investors, he finally had a term sheet in hand. Despite this huge milestone, Kapoor knew it was only the start of a long process of raising money. He only had three days to get back to Sharma and indicate whether he would like to initiate the diligence process. While he was familiar with some of the terms venture capital investors put into their contracts, many others were completely alien to him. Which terms were important? Which ones should he focus on negotiating? He also knew that money was only part of what the venture capital brought to the table. Was VC Ventures the right partner for his business? Kapoor knew he had a busy few days ahead of him as he thought through all of the questions before getting back to Vikram Sharma.

Keywords: entrepreneurial finance; venture capital term sheet; india; Business Startups; Investment; Venture Capital; Contracts; Partners and Partnerships; Entrepreneurship; Negotiation Offer; Decision Making;

Language: English

Format: Print

7 pages

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Citation:

Nanda, Ramana. "H-Soft Mumbai." Harvard Business School Case 812-168, May 2012. (Revised October 2012.)

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H-Soft Mumbai

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H-Soft Mumbai

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