H-Soft Mumbai

Ramana  Nanda

Case | HBS Case Collection | May 2012 (Revised October 2012)

H-Soft Mumbai

Abstract

Siddharth Kapoor, the Founder and CEO of H-Soft Mumbai reflected on his meeting as he walked out of VC Ventures' offices in Mumbai. After a few months of intensely pitching his startup to several different investors, he finally had a term sheet in hand. Despite this huge milestone, Kapoor knew it was only the start of a long process of raising money. He only had three days to get back to Sharma and indicate whether he would like to initiate the diligence process. While he was familiar with some of the terms venture capital investors put into their contracts, many others were completely alien to him. Which terms were important? Which ones should he focus on negotiating? He also knew that money was only part of what the venture capital brought to the table. Was VC Ventures the right partner for his business? Kapoor knew he had a busy few days ahead of him as he thought through all of the questions before getting back to Vikram Sharma.

Keywords: entrepreneurial finance; venture capital term sheet; india; Business Startups; Investment; Venture Capital; Contracts; Partners and Partnerships; Entrepreneurship; Negotiation Offer; Decision Making;

Language: English

Format: Print

7 pages

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Citation:

Nanda, Ramana. "H-Soft Mumbai." Harvard Business School Case 812-168, May 2012. (Revised October 2012.)

An extensive literature on venture capital has studied asymmetric information and agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs, examining how separating entrepreneurs from the investor can create frictions that might inhibit the funding of good projects. It has largely abstracted away from the fact that a startup typically does not have just one investor, but several VCs that come together in a syndicate to finance a venture. In this chapter, we therefore argue for an expansion of the standard perspective to also include frictions within VC syndicates. Put differently, what are the frictions that arise from the fact that there is not just one investor for each venture but several investors with different incentives, objectives, and cash flow rights who nevertheless need to collaborate to help make the venture a success? We outline the ways in which these coordination frictions manifest themselves, describe the underlying drivers, and document several contractual solutions used by VCs to mitigate their effects. We believe that this broader perspective provides several promising avenues for future research.

We use the construction of India's Golden Quadrangle (GQ) central highway network, together with comprehensive loan data drawn from the Reserve Bank of India, to investigate the interaction between infrastructure development and financial sector depth. We identify a disproportionate increase in loan count and average loan size in districts along the GQ highway network using stringent specifications with industry and district fixed effects. Our results hold in straight-line IV frameworks and are not present in “placebo tests” with another highway that was planned to be upgraded at the same time as GQ but subsequently delayed. Importantly, however, results are concentrated in districts with stronger initial financial development, suggesting that while financing does respond to large infrastructure investments and help spur real economic outcomes, initial financial sector development might play an important role in determining where real activity will grow.

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H-Soft Mumbai

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H-Soft Mumbai

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