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• Article | Management Science | November 2020

  Casting Conference Calls

  Lauren Cohen, Dong Lou and Christopher J. Malloy

  We explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can control information flow to the markets. We find that firms that “cast” their conference calls by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts tend to underperform in the future. Firms that call on more favorable analysts experience more negative future earnings surprises and more future earnings restatements. A long-short portfolio that exploits this differential firm behavior earns abnormal returns of up to 149 basis points per month or almost 18 percent per year. We find similar evidence in an international sample of earnings call transcripts from the UK, Canada, France, and Japan. Firms with higher discretionary accruals, firms that barely meet/exceed earnings expectations, and firms (and their executives) that are about to issue equity, sell shares, and exercise options, are all significantly more likely to cast their earnings calls.

  Keywords: strategic release; firms; conference calls; Information; Strategy; Asset Pricing;

  Citation:

  Cohen, Lauren, Dong Lou, and Christopher J. Malloy. "Casting Conference Calls." Management Science 66, no. 11 (November 2020): 5015–5039. (Winner of the First Prize, Crowell Memorial Award for Best Paper in Quantitative Investments, PanAgora Asset Management, 2014.)  View Details

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• Article | Journal of Financial Economics | October 2020

  IQ from IP: Simplifying Search in Portfolio Choice

  Huaizhi Chen, Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun, Dong Lou and Christopher J. Malloy

  Using a novel database that tracks web traffic on the SEC’s EDGAR servers between 2004 and 2015, we show that mutual fund managers gather information on a very particular subset of firms and insiders, and their surveillance is very persistent over time. This tracking behavior has powerful implications for their portfolio choice and its information content. An institution that downloaded an insider-trading filing by a given firm last quarter increases its likelihood of downloading an insider-trading filing on the same firm by more than 41.3% this quarter. Moreover, the average tracked stock that an institution buys generates annualized alphas of between 9% to 18% relative to the purchase of an average non-tracked stock. We find that institutional managers tend to track members of the top management teams of firms (CEOs, CFOs, presidents, and board chairs) and tend to share educational and location-based commonalities with the specific insiders they choose to follow. Collectively, our results suggest that the information in tracked trades is important for fundamental firm value and is only revealed following the information-rich dual trading by insiders and linked institutions.

  Keywords: tracked trades; Return Predictability; institutional trading; insider trading; Institutional Investing; Information; Investment Portfolio; Decisions; Management;

  Citation:

  Chen, Huaizhi, Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun, Dong Lou, and Christopher J. Malloy. "IQ from IP: Simplifying Search in Portfolio Choice." Journal of Financial Economics 138, no. 1 (October 2020): 118–137. (Winner of the First Prize, Crowell Memorial Award for Best Paper in Quantitative Investments, PanAgora Asset Management, 2019.)  View Details

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• Article | Journal of Finance | June 2020

  Lazy Prices

  Lauren Cohen, Christopher J. Malloy and Quoc Nguyen

  We explore the implications of a subtle "default" choice that firms make in their regular reporting practices, namely that firms typically repeat what they most recently reported. Using the complete history of regular quarterly and annual filings by U.S. corporations from 1995 to 2014, we show that when firms make an active change in their reporting practices, this conveys an important signal about the firm. Changes to the language and construction of financial reports have strong implications for firms' future returns: a portfolio that shorts "changers" and buys "non-changers" earns up to 188 basis points per month (over 22% per year) in abnormal returns in the future. These reporting changes are concentrated in the management discussion (MD&A) section. Changes in language referring to the executive (CEO and CFO) team, or regarding litigation, are especially informative for future returns.

  Keywords: information; default behavior; inertia; firms; annual reports; disclosure; Information; Business or Company Management; Behavior; Corporate Disclosure; Financial Reporting; United States;

  Citation:

  Cohen, Lauren, Christopher J. Malloy, and Quoc Nguyen. "Lazy Prices." Journal of Finance 75, no. 3 (June 2020): 1371–1415. (Winner of the First Prize, Chicago Quantitative Alliance Academic Paper Competition, 2016. Winner of the Jack Treynor Prize for superior work in the field of investment management and financial markets, sponsored by the Q-Group,The Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance, 2016. Winner of the Hillcrest Behavioral Finance Prize, 2016.)  View Details

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