We explore the implications of a subtle "default" choice that firms make in their regular reporting practices, namely that firms typically repeat what they most recently reported. Using the complete history of regular quarterly and annual filings by U.S. corporations from 1995 to 2014, we show that when firms make an active change in their reporting practices, this conveys an important signal about the firm. Changes to the language and construction of financial reports have strong implications for firms' future returns: a portfolio that shorts "changers" and buys "non-changers" earns up to 188 basis points per month (over 22% per year) in abnormal returns in the future. These reporting changes are concentrated in the management discussion (MD&A) section. Changes in language referring to the executive (CEO and CFO) team, or regarding litigation, are especially informative for future returns.
Keywords: information; default behavior; inertia; firms; annual reports; disclosure; Information; Business or Company Management; Behavior; Corporate Disclosure; Financial Reporting; United States;
Citation:
Cohen, Lauren, Christopher J. Malloy, and Quoc Nguyen. "Lazy Prices." Journal of Finance 75, no. 3 (June 2020): 1371–1415. (Winner of the First Prize, Chicago Quantitative Alliance Academic Paper Competition, 2016. Winner of the Jack Treynor Prize for superior work in the field of investment management and financial markets, sponsored by the Q-Group,The Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance, 2016. Winner of the Hillcrest Behavioral Finance Prize, 2016.) View Details