The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance

William R. Kerr; Josh   Lerner; Antoinette  Schoar

Article | Review of Financial Studies | January 2014

The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance: Evidence from Angel Financings

by William R. Kerr, Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar

Abstract

This paper documents that ventures that are funded by two successful angel groups experience superior outcomes to rejected ventures: they have improved survival, exits, employment, patenting, web traffic, and financing. We use strong discontinuities in angel funding behavior over small changes in their collective interest levels to implement a regression discontinuity approach. We confirm the positive effects for venture operations, with qualitative support for a higher likelihood of successful exits. On the other hand, there is no difference in access to additional financing around the discontinuity. This might suggest that financing is not a central input of angel groups.

Keywords: Business Ventures; Financing and Loans; Interests; Employment; Patents; Web; Operations; Entrepreneurship; Business Exit or Shutdown;

Format: Print

Find at Harvard Read Now

Citation:

Kerr, William R., Josh Lerner, and Antoinette Schoar. "The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance: Evidence from Angel Financings." Review of Financial Studies 27, no. 1 (January 2014): 20–55.

The case opens in 2017 with two of the five co-founders of MISHA telling the company’s CEO Michal Portz that they believe it is time for the global venture to shut down its operations and cease investments. Portz and another co-founder believe MISHA can still work.
The case describes the origins of the ready-to-use capsule solution for shisha smokers and the evolution of MISHA from idea to product design, manufacturing, marketing, and distribution. Consequent mishaps slow down the performance of MISHA, and after five years of the product being in the market and four financing rounds, numbers are far behind what they were in the business plan. The case explores the pivots the company goes through. The central dilemma is this: should the cofounders pull the plug on the company or invest more time and money to try to turn it around? When and according to which criteria should Portz make such a decision?

This paper undertakes a comprehensive analysis of alternative investment vehicles in private equity, using unexplored custodial data about 112 limited partners over four decades. We differentiate between alternative vehicles that are GP-directed versus those where the LP has some discretion. Of the roughly 5500 distinct investments made by the LPs in our sample, 32% of investments (17% of capital commitments) were in such alternative vehicles; the allocation increased by more than 10 percentage points over the last decade. Alternative vehicles were far more likely to be offered by larger and North America-based buyout funds. The average performance of these alternative vehicles lagged that of the GPs’ corresponding main funds. The best LP performance was among endowments, private pensions, and insurers. Finally, LPs with better past performance invested in alternative vehicles with better performance, even after conditioning on the GPs’ past records. This result suggests that bargaining between GPs and LPs leads to gradation in investment performance based on the parties’ outside options.

Faculty & Research

The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance: Evidence from Angel Financings

Abstract

Citation:

About the Authors

More from these Authors