Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?

Lauren  Cohen; Joshua  Coval; Christopher J. Malloy

Article | Journal of Political Economy | December 2011

Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?

by Lauren Cohen, Joshua Coval and Christopher J. Malloy

Abstract

This paper employs a new empirical approach for identifying the impact of government spending on the private sector. Our key innovation is to use changes in congressional committee chairmanship as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal expenditures. In doing so, we show that fiscal spending shocks appear to significantly dampen corporate sector investment and employment activity. This retrenchment follows both Senate and House committee chair changes, occurs in large and small firms and within large and small states, and is most pronounced among geographically concentrated firms. The effects are economically meaningful and the mechanism-entirely distinct from the more traditional interest rate and tax channels-suggests new considerations in assessing the impact of government spending on private sector economic activity.

Keywords: Spending; Private Sector; Taxation; Innovation and Invention; Interest Rates; Business and Government Relations; Investment; Employment; Power and Influence;

Format: Print

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Cohen, Lauren, Joshua Coval, and Christopher J. Malloy. "Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?" Journal of Political Economy 119, no. 6 (December 2011): 1015–1060. (Click here for a response to Snyder and Welch, click here for the data, and click here for the code.)

Using a novel database that tracks web traffic on the SEC’s EDGAR servers between 2004 and 2015, we show that mutual fund managers gather information on a very particular subset of firms and insiders, and their surveillance is very persistent over time. This tracking behavior has powerful implications for their portfolio choice, and its information content. An institution that downloaded an insider-trading filing by a given firm last quarter increases its likelihood of downloading an insider-trading filing on the same firm by more than 41.3% this quarter. Moreover, the average tracked stock that an institution buys generates annualized alphas of between 9-18% relative to the purchase of an average non-tracked stock. We find that institutional managers tend to track members of the top management teams of firms (CEOs, CFOs, Presidents, and Board Chairs), and tend to share educational and location-based commonalities with the specific insiders they choose to follow. Collectively, our results suggest that the information in tracked trades is important for fundamental firm value, and is only revealed following the information-rich dual trading by insiders and linked institutions.

Connecting life insurance policyholders with potential investors (called Life Settlement Providers), Ashar Group plays a pivotal role in the industry. Its current position is, however, increasingly being challenged by consumer-direct models, led by major providers seeking to shortcut brokers. Ashar faces a strategic dilemma in cooperating—but also in competing—with these providers. Maintaining a mutually beneficial dynamic with policyholders, downstream intermediaries, and other actors thus constitutes a balancing act. The context of this case is an underdeveloped market whose reputation has suffered from broker misconduct. In light of the market’s legacy issues and competing business models, this case study explores strategies Ashar may pursue to secure and enhance its market position. Discussions emerging from this case study have the potential to illuminate directions for market transformation.

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Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?

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