Mutual Fund Trading Pressure: Firm-Level Stock Price Impact and Timing of SEOs

Mozaffar N. Khan; Leonid  Kogan; George  Serafeim

Article | Journal of Finance | 2012

Mutual Fund Trading Pressure: Firm-Level Stock Price Impact and Timing of SEOs

by Mozaffar N. Khan, Leonid Kogan and George Serafeim

Abstract

In tests of the equity market timing theory of external finance, the prior literature has used overvaluation identifiers such as high market-to-book and high prior returns that are likely correlated with other determinants of SEOs. We use price pressure resulting from purchases by mutual funds with large capital inflows to identify overvalued equity. This is a relatively exogenous overvaluation indicator as it is associated with who is buying—buyers with excess liquidity—rather than what is being purchased. Using this indicator we document that 1) inflow-driven buying pressure by mutual funds has a pronounced and persistent stock price impact, 2) the probability of an SEO increases by 59%, 3) insider sales increase by 7%, and 4) the probability of completing a stock-based acquisition increases by 20% in the four quarters following the buying pressure. These results provide new evidence that firm managers are able to identify and exploit overvalued equity.

Keywords: Equity; Market Transactions; Valuation; Capital Structure; Market Timing; Mathematical Methods; Acquisition;

Format: Print

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Citation:

Khan, Mozaffar N., Leonid Kogan, and George Serafeim. "Mutual Fund Trading Pressure: Firm-Level Stock Price Impact and Timing of SEOs." Journal of Finance 67, no. 4 (August 2012): 1371–1395.

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Mutual Fund Trading Pressure: Firm-Level Stock Price Impact and Timing of SEOs

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