Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality

Neeru  Paharia; Lucas Clayton Coffman; Max   Bazerman

Chapter | The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution | Forthcoming

Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality

by Neeru Paharia, Lucas Clayton Coffman and Max Bazerman

Abstract

This article compares direct deception with deception via an intermediary in the bargaining context. It describes a growing experimental literature that suggests how perceived ethics surrounding transactions with multiple partners can encourage misbehavior. It is noted that causing harm indirectly through another can protect harm doers. Harm doers are apparently protected from punishment as well. The hypothesis that intermediation reduces punishment runs counter to predictions coming from a model in which solely unfair actions are punished. Experiments are also presented that show a phenomenon about the attribution of responsibility and subsequent blame (and praise) in negotiation and conflict resolution settings. It is believed that by making people more aware of their failure to notice and punish indirect unethical behavior, others can create a world where the use of intermediation will no longer provide harm doers an easy escape from public awareness.

Keywords: Negotiation Process; Ethics;

Format: Print

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Paharia, Neeru, Lucas Clayton Coffman, and Max Bazerman. "Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality." In The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution, edited by Gary E. Bolton and Rachel T.A. Croson, 37–46. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

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Article | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Signing at the Beginning vs at the End Does Not Decrease Dishonesty

Ariella Kristal, A.V. Whillans, Max Bazerman, Francesca Gino, Lisa Shu, Nina Mazar and Dan Ariely

Honest reporting is essential for society to function well. However, people frequently lie when asked to provide information, such as misrepresenting their income to save money on taxes. A landmark finding published in PNAS (Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, and Bazerman, 2012, “Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest Self-reports in Comparison to Signing at the End”) provided evidence for a simple way of encouraging honest reporting: asking people to sign a veracity statement at the beginning instead of at the end of a self-report form. Since this finding was published, various government agencies have adopted this practice. However, in this project, we failed to replicate this result. Across five conceptual replications (N = 4,559) and one highly powered, pre-registered, direct replication (N = 1,235) conducted with the authors of the original paper, we observed no effect of signing first on honest reporting. Given the policy applications of this result, it is important to update the scientific record regarding the veracity of these results.

Keywords: Morality; nudge; policy-making; replication; honesty; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Policy;

Citation:

Kristal, Ariella, A.V. Whillans, Max Bazerman, Francesca Gino, Lisa Shu, Nina Mazar, and Dan Ariely. "Signing at the Beginning vs at the End Does Not Decrease Dishonesty." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 117, no. 13 (March 31, 2020). View Details

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Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality

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