Energy Security in Europe (A): Nord Stream

Rawi E. Abdelal; Sogomon  Tarontsi

Case | HBS Case Collection | November 2010 (Revised February 2013)

Energy Security in Europe (A): Nord Stream

by Rawi E. Abdelal and Sogomon Tarontsi

Abstract

Russian and German energy firms initiated the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline project with strong political support from their home governments but encountered resistance from other states. Although the pipeline would connect Russia with Germany directly, the project was not simply a bilateral matter. First, a need to secure construction permits in multiple jurisdictions around the Baltic Sea involved other countries. And second, Germany's membership in the European Union entailed compliance with goals and values of the entire union, which stressed the imperative of collective action in energy matters and dangers of succumbing to "national reflexes." Thus the implications of the project became a matter of concern to the entire European Union but Europeans struggled to articulate the meaning of Nord Stream: was it a "separate peace" between Russia and Germany to the detriment of the rest, or was it a pan-European deal to the benefit of all? As the case chronicles, the success of Nord Stream depended on the ability of its creators to ensure that latter view prevailed over the former.

Keywords: Non-Renewable Energy; Leadership; Distribution; Business and Government Relations; Conflict and Resolution; Energy Industry; Russia; European Union; Germany;

Language: English

Format: Print

40 pages

Educators Purchase

Citation:

Abdelal, Rawi E., and Sogomon Tarontsi. "Energy Security in Europe (A): Nord Stream." Harvard Business School Case 711-026, November 2010. (Revised February 2013.)

The collapse of central authority in the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a period of revolutionary transformations for the states that emerged in its wake. The leaders of Russia, the USSR's successor, struggled to reestablish central authority while also seeking to avoid further disintegration, establish a democratic polity, and institute a market economy across the next several years. Russia would navigate further economic crisis and a swiftly evolving geopolitical order as it returned to the world stage. The case examines the different governance approaches adopted by Presidents Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, and concludes with a discussion of Russia’s strategic challenges and opportunities in 2020. The case focuses on problems of state authority; fiscal capacity; institutionalization of political parties; relations between the federal center and provincial governments; relations between the state and big business; economic policy; international relations; and models of economic development.

Article | Notes de l'Ifri | January 23, 2020

Sanctions and the End of Trans-Atlanticism: Iran, Russia, and the Unintended Division of the West

Rawi Abdelal and Aurélie Bros

Sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft in the United States and other Western states, especially the European Union, since the end of the Cold War. But the systematic use of this instrument may produce unintended and somewhat paradoxical geopolitical consequences. The sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation in the field of energy are particularly illustrative of this phenomenon.
Firstly, Iran and Russia demonstrated their resilience and a real ability to adapt, thus transforming the perspective to European companies. One of Tehran's responses to sanctions was to establish the so-called "resistance economy" in order to make Iran resistant to all kinds of economic shocks and reduce the reliance on a single commodity. For its part, Russia has adapted and offered new perspective to European and Asian businesses by creating a precedent with the case of Total. Some European companies are not ready to operate according to these rules—at least in the gas sector, as oil is too risky relative to U.S. policy and law.
Secondly, differences in the approach of the United States and Europe over the type and intensity of economic statecraft against both Iran and Russia have increasingly undermined trans-Atlanticism. The so-called secondary sanctions imposed on both Iran and Russia have become the primary vehicle for signaling and even implementing a decoupling of U.S. and European political objectives. On the one hand, the costs of complying with U.S. secondary sanctions is perceived as too high for European companies. On the other, Europeans are not ready to bear the consequences of internal U.S. divisions.
All of this might even have reinvigorated the European project, by triggering a debate on the need for European countries to protect their economic sovereignty. The European Green Deal might become the emerging unifying theme that might relaunch the European project and make Europe a fully-fledged geopolitical actor.

Keywords: geopolitics; economic sanctions; International Relations; United States; Russia; Iran; Europe;

Citation:

Abdelal, Rawi, and Aurélie Bros. "Sanctions and the End of Trans-Atlanticism: Iran, Russia, and the Unintended Division of the West." Notes de l'Ifri (January 23, 2020). View Details

Cite View Details Read Now