Performance Persistence in Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital

Paul A. Gompers; Josh   Lerner; David  Scharfstein; Anna  Kovner

Article | Journal of Financial Economics | April 2010

Performance Persistence in Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital

by Paul A. Gompers, Josh Lerner, David Scharfstein and Anna Kovner

Abstract

This paper presents evidence of performance persistence in entrepreneurship. We show that entrepreneurs with a track record of success are much more likely to succeed than first-time entrepreneurs and those who have previously failed. In particular, they exhibit persistence in selecting the right industry and time to start new ventures. Entrepreneurs with demonstrated market-timing skill are also more likely to outperform industry peers in their subsequent ventures. This is consistent with the view that if suppliers and customers perceive the entrepreneur to have market-timing skill, and is therefore more likely to succeed, they will be more willing to commit resources to the firm. In this way, success breeds success and strengthens performance persistence.

Keywords: Performance; Entrepreneurship; Venture Capital; Market Timing; Competency and Skills; Customers; Resource Allocation; Success; Business Startups;

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Citation:

Gompers, Paul A., Josh Lerner, David Scharfstein, and Anna Kovner. "Performance Persistence in Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital." Journal of Financial Economics 96, no. 1 (April 2010): 731–764.

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Performance Persistence in Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital

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