When Open Architecture Beats Closed: The Entrepreneurial Use of Architectural Knowledge

Carliss Y. Baldwin

Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2010

When Open Architecture Beats Closed: The Entrepreneurial Use of Architectural Knowledge

Abstract

This paper describes how entrepreneurial firms can use superior architectural knowledge to open up a technical system to gain strategic advantage. The strategy involves, first, identifying "bottlenecks" in the existing system, and then creating a new open architecture that isolates the bottlenecks in modules and allows others to connect to the system at key interfaces. An entrepreneurial firm with limited financial resources can then focus on supplying superior bottleneck modules, while outsourcing and allowing complementors to supply non-bottleneck components. I show that a firm pursuing this strategy will have a higher return on invested capital (ROIC) than competitors with a less modular, closed architecture. Over time, the more open firm can drive the ROIC of competitors below their cost of capital, causing them to shrink and possibly exit the market. The strategy was used by Sun Microsystems in the 1980s and Dell Computer in the 1990s.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Investment Return; Growth and Development Strategy; Product Design; Organizational Design; Competitive Advantage; Technology Industry;

Language: English

Format: Print

45 pages

Read Now

Citation:

Baldwin, Carliss Y. "When Open Architecture Beats Closed: The Entrepreneurial Use of Architectural Knowledge." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-063, February 2010. (Revised July 2010, October 2010.)

Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2019

Design Rules, Volume 2: How Technology Shapes Organizations: Chapter 8 Rationalizing Flow Processes

Carliss Y. Baldwin

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the value structure of flow production processes and to explain why it is necessary to rationalize flow processes using the tools of systematic management. I first explain the problems facing managers of multi-step flow production processes at the end of the 19th Century. I introduce a model of the value structure of a production process made up of interdependent steps and define the production bottleneck of the process. I use the mathematical definition of a bottleneck to derive two general properties of stochastic multi-step flow processes with bottlenecks. These properties imply a need for ongoing managerial oversight and intervention using a set of tools that went by the label systematic management. Without active systematic management to address production bottlenecks, large-scale flow processes can easily collapse into chaos. I then argue that that the use of automated machinery, larger (or growing) markets, and systematic management are supermodular complements: each attribute makes the other two more valuable. The next chapter will explore how the technological requirements of multi-step flow production processes affect the optimal design of organizations implementing these technologies.

Keywords: flow processes; bottleneck; systematic management; Production; Management; Problems and Challenges;

Citation:

Baldwin, Carliss Y. "Design Rules, Volume 2: How Technology Shapes Organizations: Chapter 8 Rationalizing Flow Processes." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-032, September 2019. View Details

Cite View Details Read Now

The purpose of this chapter is to explain what the technologies of flow production with stochastic bottlenecks require and reward in organizations. I argue that organizations successfully implementing these technologies are likely to have unified governance and exercise direct authority over process design, job definitions, and task assignments. As they come to employ more people, they will create hierarchical management structures as a means of managing information flows and delegating decision rights. Finally from the early 20th Century through the present, most of these organizations saw advantage in being legally organized as corporations, which could own assets, enter into contracts, and employ individuals in their own right. The result was a “paradigm” of mass production—a cluster of concepts that came to define both “big business” and “high technology” in the United States and elsewhere. Throughout the middle years of the 20th Century, many members of society took for granted the fact that successful businesses using advanced technology would be organized as large, vertically integrated corporations, exercise direct authority, and use managerial hierarchies to channel information and delegate responsibility.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore how technologies and organizations engaged in flow production evolve over time. To allow for an apples-to-apples comparison, I examine organizations using essentially the same physical technologies, making similar products, and competing in the same markets. Specifically, I look at the organizational differences among the largest automakers in the United States and Japan. I focus first on Ford between 1910 and 1930, then on General Motors from the 1920s through the 1960s, then Toyota (and other Japanese automakers) from the 1960s through 2000. The differences among these organizations show that while technology shapes organizations within broad limits, it does not determine an organization’s complete design nor its long-term competitive success.

Faculty & Research

When Open Architecture Beats Closed: The Entrepreneurial Use of Architectural Knowledge

Abstract

Citation:

About the Author

More from the Author