Baosteel Group: Governance with Chinese Characteristics

Lynn S. Paine; G.A.  Donovan

Case | HBS Case Collection | March 2009

Baosteel Group: Governance with Chinese Characteristics

by Lynn S. Paine and G.A. Donovan

Abstract

The new outsider-dominated board of directors of China's state-owned Baosteel Group must decide whether to modify the Group's structure. With the completion of a pending acquisition, the Group will control four publicly listed steel-producing subsidiaries, and board members are concerned about competition among the subsidiaries and about the subsidiaries' public shareholders. Selected by the Chinese government as the first company to take part in a pilot project on corporate governance in state-owned enterprises, Baosteel and its board are under intense scrutiny by Chinese and overseas investors in the listed subsidiaries as well as by China's political leadership and the media. The case provides background on Baosteel, China's SOE reform, the Chinese government's pilot project on corporate governance, and the functioning of Baosteel's newly constituted board of directors.

Keywords: Business Subsidiaries; Corporate Governance; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Governing and Advisory Boards; State Ownership; China;

Format: Print

29 pages

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Citation:

Paine, Lynn S., and G.A. Donovan. "Baosteel Group: Governance with Chinese Characteristics." Harvard Business School Case 309-098, March 2009.

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Baosteel Group: Governance with Chinese Characteristics

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