Washington Mutual's Covered Bonds

Daniel Baird Bergstresser; Robin  Greenwood; James  Quinn

Case | HBS Case Collection | March 2009 (Revised November 2016)

Washington Mutual's Covered Bonds

by Daniel Baird Bergstresser, Robin Greenwood and James Quinn

Abstract

Washington Mutual issued 6 billion euro of covered bonds in 2006. The objective of the case is to ask whether these bonds are mispriced in late 2008. The case is set in September 2008, and Washington Mutual is facing considerable distress due to mounting losses in its mortgage portfolio. Following investment bank Lehman Brother's Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection filing in mid-September, the price of Washington Mutual's covered bonds has fallen to 75 per 100 of face value. As these bonds are overcollateralized, the case asks students to evaluate the underlying collateral portfolio in the event of liquidation, as well as assessing the likelihood of different outcomes. The case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in the global capital markets.

Keywords: Capital Markets; Financial Liquidity; Bonds; Mortgages; Price; Banking Industry; United States;

Language: English

Format: Print

25 pages

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Citation:

Bergstresser, Daniel Baird, Robin Greenwood, and James Quinn. "Washington Mutual's Covered Bonds." Harvard Business School Case 209-093, March 2009. (Revised November 2016.)

In February and March 2009, the US economy was in the midst of a terrifying financial and economic crisis. Between the beginning of 2008 and early 2009, four of the 25 largest U.S. financial institutions had failed, and nine of these 25 institutions had taken extraordinary steps to avoid failure—either receiving one-off government support, merging with another firm, or submitting to heightened regulation to qualify for future government support. Led by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, the government had to quickly devise policies to stabilize the financial system and the economy. The case explores the details of policies, and the decision making process that led to them, that Geithner and his team devised under immense time pressure to stabilize the system. The case features an extended discussion of Geithner’s innovative “stress test”, which would reveal the longer-term health of the country’s largest banks.

On the afternoon of Monday October 13, 2008, Hank Paulson Jr., the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, walked into the large conference room across the hall from his office in the Treasury Department. Joining him were Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Timothy Geithner, Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate Sheila Bair, and the Chief Executive Officers of nine of the largest banks in the United States. This distinguished group had been brought together by the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Financial panic was pushing the U.S. and European financial systems to the brink of failure. Paulson hoped his meeting with the bank CEOs would be a turning point. U.S. financial markets were closed for Columbus Day, and Paulson was planning to announce the latest government actions to stabilize the financial system before markets reopened on Tuesday.

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Washington Mutual's Covered Bonds

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Washington Mutual's Covered Bonds

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