Publications
Publications
- Financial Management
Family Control of Firms and Industries
Abstract
We test what explains family control of firms and industries and find that the explanation is largely contingent on the identity of families and individual blockholders. Founders and their families are more likely to retain control when doing so gives the firm a competitive advantage, thereby benefiting all shareholders. In contrast, non-founding families and individual blockholders are more likely to retain control when they can appropriate private benefits of control. Families are more likely to maintain control when the efficient scale is small, the need to monitor employees is high, investment horizons are long, and the firm has dual-class stock.
Keywords
Family Business; Cost vs Benefits; Governance Controls; Family Ownership; Business and Shareholder Relations; Competitive Advantage
Citation
Villalonga, Belen, and Raphael Amit. "Family Control of Firms and Industries." Financial Management 39, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 863–904. (Lead article.)