Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints and Firm Entry Size

William R. Kerr; Ramana  Nanda

Article | Journal of the European Economic Association | April – May 2010

Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints and Firm Entry Size

Abstract

We examine the effect of US branch banking deregulations on the entry size of new firms using micro-data from the US Census Bureau. We find that the average entry size for startups did not change following the deregulations. However, among firms that survived at least four years, a greater proportion of firms entered either at their maximum size or closer to the maximum size in the first year. The magnitude of these effects were small compared to the much larger changes in entry rates of small firms following the reforms. Our results highlight that this large-scale entry at the extensive margin can obscure the more subtle intensive margin effects of changes in financing constraints.

Keywords: Business Startups; Financing and Loans; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Market Entry and Exit; Banking Industry; United States;

Format: Print

12 pages

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Citation:

Kerr, William R., and Ramana Nanda. "Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints and Firm Entry Size." Journal of the European Economic Association 8, nos. 2-3 (April–May 2010): 582–593.

Case | HBS Case Collection | July 2019 (Revised May 2020)

AT&T, Retraining, and the Workforce of Tomorrow

William R. Kerr, Joseph B. Fuller and Carl Kreitzberg

By the late 2000s, rapid changes in the telecommunications industry forced AT&T’s management team to take on a task that CEO Randall Stephenson called the “biggest logistical challenge” they had ever seen: retraining 100,000 workers by 2020. In 2012, internal company analyses found that AT&T’s workforce would lack the skills it needed to fulfill emerging job requirements. AT&T responded by creating “Workforce 2020,” a company-wide initiative that sought to address potential skill shortfalls. The initiative aimed to transform AT&T’s workforce by implementing multiple changes, such as redesigning job roles, developing new educational curricula with Udacity, and incentivizing employees to retrain themselves for high-demand careers. Some gave high praise to the “Workforce 2020” model, going so far as to call it a new “social contract” between employers and employees. Others worried that the new program was systematically disadvantaging specific groups of workers. In 2018, AT&T rebranded Workforce 2020 to “Future Ready,” signaling the company’s commitment to retraining its workforce beyond 2020.

Keywords: AT＆T; workforce; skills; future of work; telecommunications; Unions; technological change; layoffs; MOOCS; Strategic Planning; Employees; Training; Competency and Skills; Labor; Learning; Labor Unions; Technology Adoption; Talent and Talent Management; Telecommunications Industry; Communications Industry; United States;

Citation:

Kerr, William R., Joseph B. Fuller, and Carl Kreitzberg. "AT&T, Retraining, and the Workforce of Tomorrow." Harvard Business School Case 820-017, July 2019. (Revised May 2020.) View Details

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We use individual-level data to shed light on the evolution of founder-CEO compensation in venture capital-backed startups. We document that having a tangible, marketable product is a fundamental milestone in CEOs' compensation contracts, marking the point at which liquid cash compensation begins to increase significantly – well before a liquidity event. “Product market fit” also coincides with key human capital in the startup becoming more replaceable, marking an apparent transition in the firm's lifecycle from differentiation to standardization. Although substantial increases in cash compensation for founder-CEOs in response to milestones improves the certainty equivalent of attempting entrepreneurship relative to flat pay, low cash compensation in the very early years can still deter entrepreneurship for potential entrants. We characterize the types of individuals most likely to be impacted by this constraint and hence those whose ideas are unlikely to be commercialized through VC-backed entrepreneurship.

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Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints and Firm Entry Size

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