Publications
Publications
- July 2010
- Journal of Financial Economics
Board Interlocks and the Propensity to Be Targeted in Private Equity Transactions
By: Toby E. Stuart and Soojin Yim
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the propensity for U.S. public companies to become targets for private equity-backed, take-private transactions. We consider the characteristics of 483 private equity-backed deals in the 2000-2007 period relative to public companies, and find that, in addition to the financial drivers studied in previous works, board characteristics and director networks are also associated with deal generation. We find that a company that has a director who has had LBO experience through prior board service is approximately 40% more likely to receive a private equity offer, and that the strength of this effect varies with the influence of the director and the quality of the prior LBO experience. This effect is robust to the most likely alternative explanations and supports the idea that directors and social networks play an influential role in change-of-control transactions.
Keywords
Board Interlocks; Board Networks; Social Networks; Private Equity; Corporate Governance; Public Ownership; Market Transactions; Governing and Advisory Boards; United States
Citation
Stuart, Toby E., and Soojin Yim. "Board Interlocks and the Propensity to Be Targeted in Private Equity Transactions." Journal of Financial Economics 97, no. 1 (July 2010): 174–189.