NEC Electronics (CW)

C. Fritz  Foley; Robin  Greenwood; James  Quinn

Supplement | HBS Case Collection | November 2008

NEC Electronics (CW)

by C. Fritz Foley, Robin Greenwood and James Quinn

Abstract

Why do shares in NEC Electronics, a publicly listed subsidiary of Japan conglomerate NEC trade at a discount to their fundamental value? Can Perry Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, restructure this subsidiary and generate significant returns? This case provides students with an opportunity to analyze Perry's decision to invest in NEC Electronics. In doing so, it asks for the reasons that NEC might take actions that destroy value and shift value away from NECE's minority shareholders. The events covered allow for a discussion of how ownership concentration constrains restructuring alternatives, how hedge fund investors might confront controlling shareholders, and how the mis-pricing of agency costs can give rise to ownership structures that allow for minority shareholder expropriation.

Keywords: Business Conglomerates; Business Subsidiaries; Restructuring; Decisions; Investment Return; Investment Funds; Price; Ownership; Agency Theory; Business and Shareholder Relations; Value Creation; Electronics Industry; Japan; United States;

Format: Multimedia

1 pages

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Citation:

Foley, C. Fritz, Robin Greenwood, and James Quinn. "NEC Electronics (CW)." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 209-711, November 2008.

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NEC Electronics (CW)

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