Publications
Publications
  • March 2010
  • Article
  • Games and Economic Behavior

Matching with Preferences over Colleagues Solves Classical Matching

By: Scott Duke Kominers
  • Format:Print
ShareBar

Abstract

In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of "many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues" is actually more difficult than the classical many-to-one matching problem, "matching without preferences over colleagues." We give an explicit reduction of any problem of the latter type to a problem of the former type. This construction leads to the first algorithm which finds all stable matchings in the setting of "matching without preferences over colleagues," for any set of preferences. Our construction directly extends to generalized matching settings.

Keywords

Two-Sided Platforms; Balance and Stability; Mathematical Methods

Citation

Kominers, Scott Duke. "Matching with Preferences over Colleagues Solves Classical Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 68, no. 2 (March 2010): 773–780.

About The Author

Scott Duke Kominers

Entrepreneurial Management
More Publications

More from the Author