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  • Innovation Policy and the Economy

Policy Implications of Weak Patent Rights

By: James J. Anton, Hillary Greene and Dennis Yao
  • Format:Print
  • | Pages:26
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Abstract

Patents vary substantially in the degree of protection provided against unauthorized imitation. In this chapter we explore a range of work addressing the economic and policy implications of "weak" patents—patents that have a significant probability of being overturned or being circumvented relatively easily—on innovation and disclosure incentives, antitrust policy, and organizational incentives and entrepreneurial activity. Weak patents cause firms to rely more heavily on secrecy. Thus, the competitive environment is characterized by private information about the extent of the innovator's know-how. In such an environment weak patents increase the likelihood of imitation and infringement, reduce the amount of knowledge publicly disclosed, and potentially reduce the incentives to innovate. The discussion also highlights some implications of weak patents for antitrust policy. Weak patent rights increase the likelihood of patent litigation over commercially valuable patents and raise the specter of anticompetitive settlements. Encouraging the antitrust agencies to refer some patents for re-examination by the patent office would facilitate investigation of potentially anticompetitive IP settlements. Finally, we note some implications for weak property rights in settings involving employee-inventors and employee misuse of confidential information. In the former case an increase in the strength of legal property rights such as patents reduces the employer's ability to prevent employees departing with valuable know-how, in part because a stronger property right increases the value of the employee's start-up option. In the latter case, an increase in legal penalties for breach of confidentiality has the expected effect of decreasing such occurrences.

Keywords

Patents; Motivation and Incentives; Entrepreneurship; Competition; Policy; Innovation and Invention; Rights; Monopoly; Business Startups

Citation

Anton, James J., Hillary Greene, and Dennis Yao. "Policy Implications of Weak Patent Rights." Innovation Policy and the Economy 6 (2006): 1–26. (Harvard users click here for full text.)
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About The Author

Dennis A. Yao

Strategy
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