Open vs. Closed Innovation: A Model of Discovery and Divergence

Esteve  Almirall; Ramon  Casadesus-Masanell

Article | Academy of Management Review | January 2010

Open vs. Closed Innovation: A Model of Discovery and Divergence

by Esteve Almirall and Ramon Casadesus-Masanell

Abstract

When is open innovation superior to closed innovation? Through a formal simulation model, we show that an open approach to innovation allows the firm to discover combinations of product features that would be hard to envision under integration. However, when partners have divergent goals, open innovation restricts the firm's ability to establish the product's technological trajectory. The resolution of the trade-off between the benefits of discovery and the costs of divergence determines the best approach to innovation.

Keywords: Innovation and Invention; Partners and Partnerships; Goals and Objectives; Cost vs Benefits; Integration; Product;

Format: Print

21 pages

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Citation:

Almirall, Esteve, and Ramon Casadesus-Masanell. "Open vs. Closed Innovation: A Model of Discovery and Divergence." Academy of Management Review 35, no. 1 (January 2010): 27–47.

This case explores the introduction of fleet management in the construction industry by the premium power tools manufacturer Hilti in 2000. Following its customers’ needs, Hilti moved from selling power tools to leasing them as a service. The introduction of the new business model contributed significantly to the success of Hilti, since it sustainably differentiated the company from its competitors. For instance, the adoption of fleet management resulted in customer loyalty levels five times higher than under the dominant business model Hilti had formerly employed, and over-proportioned profit contribution at Hilti. Hilti’s Chief Technology Officer described the importance of the innovation as follows: “Hilti developed many very innovative and successful products over the years, but they paled in comparison with the fleet management business model, which was the most important innovation in Hilti’s history.” All told, Hilti, which had about 22,000 employees and made about 4.5 billion Swiss Francs (or $4.589 billion USD) in sales in 2015, managed 1.5 million tools under fleet management contracts in 40 countries, resulting in a contract value of more than 1.2 billion Swiss Francs (approximately $1.4 billion USD).

Case A describes the strategic decision-making process regarding the introduction of fleet management in its early planning stages.

This case explores the strategic decision-making process of premium power tools manufacturer Hilti in 1999, when the company was considering implementing a fleet management system in the construction industry. Fleet management would involve a shift from selling power tools to leasing them as a service. For Hilti, it represented an entirely new business model, which would substantially differentiate the company from its competitors. While fleet management had the potential to significantly improve the customer experience, Hilti was already a successful firm under its extant model and had to decide whether the restructuring of its business model was worth the risk.

Case | HBS Case Collection | October 2017 (Revised April 2018)

Jumia Nigeria: from Retail to Marketplace (A)

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Namrata Arora

Founded in 2012, Jumia Nigeria, a startup effort by Germany-based Rocket Internet, aimed to become an African Amazon. The company entered the nascent market and immediately enjoyed an uptick in consumer spending fueled by the strength of Nigeria’s oil-based economy. By 2016, however, Jumia’s growth had begun to taper, hindered by plummeting oil prices, the subsequent economic downturn, and the pressure of Nigeria’s limited retail ecosystem. In addition, Jumia’s inventory-intensive retail model required significant infusions of capital that, in the face of a deteriorating economy and the company’s inability to show a profit, was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. Considering all this and looking to the success of the Amazon and Alibaba marketplace models where third-party sellers largely carried inventory costs, the Board had made a drastic decision: Jumia would shift from an online retail model to a marketplace model. They also made it very clear that a failure to properly implement this transition could mean the end of investor support for Jumia. Senior management wondered how they would meet the challenges ahead. While Amazon in the U.S. and Alibaba in China had found success with the marketplace model, they wondered if Jumia would be able to do the same. Was this the right model for the very different Nigerian environment? Would vendors, many of whom already had retail operations in the country, choose to sell through Jumia? How could Jumia continue to provide the same high quality customer service on which the company’s success had been built while switching to a marketplace model in which parts of this critical aspect would now be in the hands of third parties?

Keywords: globalization; Expansion; retail; marketplace; Inventory; Nigeria; Africa; ecommerce; competition; funding; Logistics; Competition; Business Model; Globalization; Emerging Markets; Expansion; Logistics; Retail Industry; India; Nigeria; Africa;

Citation:

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Namrata Arora. "Jumia Nigeria: from Retail to Marketplace (A)." Harvard Business School Case 718-401, October 2017. (Revised April 2018.) View Details

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Open vs. Closed Innovation: A Model of Discovery and Divergence

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