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• Case | HBS Case Collection | September 2019 (Revised September 2019)

  Facebook Fake News in the Post-Truth World

  John R. Wells, Carole A. Winkler and Benjamin Weinstock

  In August 2019, Mark Zuckerberg, founder and CEO of Facebook, was surrounded by controversy. The first major storm of protest followed the surprise election of Donald Trump as President of the United States on November 8, 2016; many put the blame at the door of fake news stories served up on Facebook’s Trending News Feed. Zuckerberg dismissed these claims as “crazy,” asserting that Facebook was a technology company, not a media company. In 2017, it was revealed that a Russian intelligence team had purchased 3,000 political ads on Facebook in an attempt to influence the 2016 US Presidential Election. Then, in March 2018, the public learned that Cambridge Analytica, a political consultancy, had used 87 million Facebook profiles obtained from scraping the site to affect the election. As a result, Zuckerberg was called to Congress to testify. In early 2019, Facebook announced the company was to merge its Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, and WhatsApp platforms and share data, but that this data would be more secure. The claim was greeted with much skepticism. To explain the move, Zuckerberg published a blog post, changing the company’s mission from making the world more open to achieving privacy-focused communications on its platform. Meanwhile, Facebook continued to struggle with fake news while expanding its service offering. In June 2019, it announced it was to launch Libra, a new global cryptocurrency for its 2.5 billion users around the world. In early September 2019, it launched Facebook Dating, which promised “[to help] you start meaningful relationships through things you have in common, like interests, events and groups.” That same month, Facebook announced that it bought a New York-based start-up called CTRL-labs, which was working on developing a wristband that allowed people to control their electronic devices with brain signals. There was little doubt of the scale of Zuckerberg’s ambitions. But, ongoing investigations into Facebook’s privacy violations and calls to break up the company pointed to more fundamental issues.

  Keywords: Facebook; fake news; Mark Zuckerberg; Donald Trump; algorithms; social networks; partisanship; social media; app development; Instagram; WhatsApp; smartphone; Silicon Valley; office space; digital strategy; democracy; entry barriers; online platforms; controversy; Tencent; Agility; social networking; gaming; gaming industry; computer games; mobile gaming; messaging; monetization strategy; Advertising; Online Advertising; Business Ventures; Acquisition; Mergers and Acquisitions; Business Growth and Maturation; Business Headquarters; Business Organization; For-Profit Firms; Trends; Communication; Communication Technology; Forms of Communication; Interactive Communication; Interpersonal Communication; Talent and Talent Management; Crime and Corruption; Voting; Demographics; Entertainment; Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Moral Sensibility; Values and Beliefs; Initial Public Offering; Profit; Revenue; Geography; Geographic Location; Global Range; Local Range; Country; Cross-Cultural and Cross-Border Issues; Globalized Firms and Management; Globalized Markets and Industries; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Government and Politics; International Relations; National Security; Political Elections; Business History; Recruitment; Selection and Staffing; Information Management; Information Publishing; News; Newspapers; Innovation and Management; Innovation Strategy; Technological Innovation; Knowledge Dissemination; Human Capital; Law; Leadership Development; Leadership Style; Leading Change; Business or Company Management; Crisis Management; Goals and Objectives; Growth and Development Strategy; Growth Management; Management Practices and Processes; Management Style; Management Systems; Management Teams; Managerial Roles; Marketing Channels; Social Marketing; Network Effects; Market Entry and Exit; Market Platforms; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Industry Growth; Industry Structures; Monopoly; Media; Product Development; Service Delivery; Corporate Social Responsibility and Impact; Mission and Purpose; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Organizational Culture; Organizational Structure; Public Ownership; Problems and Challenges; Business and Community Relations; Business and Government Relations; Groups and Teams; Networks; Rank and Position; Opportunities; Behavior; Emotions; Identity; Power and Influence; Prejudice and Bias; Reputation; Social and Collaborative Networks; Status and Position; Trust; Society; Civil Society or Community; Culture; Public Opinion; Social Issues; Societal Protocols; Strategy; Adaptation; Business Strategy; Commercialization; Competition; Competitive Advantage; Competitive Strategy; Corporate Strategy; Customization and Personalization; Diversification; Expansion; Horizontal Integration; Segmentation; Information Technology; Internet; Mobile Technology; Online Technology; Software; Technology Networks; Technology Platform; Web; Web Sites; Wireless Technology; Valuation; Advertising Industry; Communications Industry; Entertainment and Recreation Industry; Information Industry; Information Technology Industry; Journalism and News Industry; Media and Broadcasting Industry; Service Industry; Technology Industry; Telecommunications Industry; Video Game Industry; United States; California; Sunnyvale; Russia;

  Citation:

  Wells, John R., Carole A. Winkler, and Benjamin Weinstock. "Facebook Fake News in the Post-Truth World." Harvard Business School Case 720-373, September 2019. (Revised September 2019.)  View Details

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• Case | HBS Case Collection | September 2019

  Blenheim Chalcot

  John R. Wells and Benjamin Weinstock

  In April 2019, Manoj Badale and Charles Mindenhall, co-founders of Blenheim Chalcot, were contemplating how they might go about developing their portfolio. Since founding the company as an internet consultancy called netdecisions in 1998, Badale and Mindenhall had transformed Blenheim Chalcot into the United Kingdom’s “leading digital venture builder,” having successfully built, and, in 15 instances, exited, 42 businesses across a number of sectors, including technology, financial services, sport, media, property, and education. In 2018, Blenheim Chalcot had portfolio sales of over £350 million and employed over 3,000 people.
  
  Unlike a traditional venture capital firm, Blenheim Chalcot was a “venture builder,” often developing its own ideas then bringing in and supporting entrepreneurs with a range of services and support, and funding them in return for a majority equity stake (typically 80-90%). The idea was to increase the probability of success by allowing the entrepreneurs and their teams to spend less time fundraising and dealing with time consuming tasks, such as property, recruitment, legal set up, and gaining access to a client network. This enabled the entrepreneur to focus more on product and customers. The downside of this approach was that the growth of the group was somewhat constrained by the founders’ own capital and their access to co-investment funds.
  
  As Badale and Mindenhall contemplated the future, they were asking themselves how they could best develop their ecosystem for building innovative businesses. In October 2018, they had opened an office in New York. They were also partnering with Imperial College London to open a 200,000 square-foot tech and innovation campus in early 2020. Should they continue on their current track? Or, should they be bolder, perhaps going public, adding new sectors, more businesses, bigger opportunities, and expanding into new geographic markets? How could they achieve these growth goals while maintaining sufficient control over the businesses? How could they achieve growth and maintain the quality of the businesses – and not spread themselves too thinly?

  Keywords: Venture Capital; Entrepreneurship; Business Model; Growth and Development Strategy; United Kingdom; United States; India;

  Citation:

  Wells, John R., and Benjamin Weinstock. "Blenheim Chalcot." Harvard Business School Case 720-381, September 2019.  View Details

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• Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2018

  The Limitations of Dynamic Capabilities

  David J. Collis and Bharat Anand

  The concept of dynamic capabilities draws its theoretical basis from two classic traditions within the strategy field—the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) (Wernerfelt, 1984) and market positioning (Porter, 1996). A dynamic capability qualifies as a source of sustained heterogeneous firm performance within the RBV framework because it arises from embedded organizational routines that accumulate in a path dependent process—the “stock” explanation of durable advantage (Barney, 1991). Because such a dynamic capability allows a firm to continually reposition itself in product market space, it satisfies the “flow” explanation of current competitive advantage by ensuring that the firm always maintains a wider gap between willingness to pay and cost than competitors (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996). Indeed, dynamic capabilities seem to give rise to the enviable ability to “always have a competitive advantage in an attractive industry” and so continually deliver superior financial performance regardless of external circumstances.

  Keywords: dynamic capabilities; Business Ventures; Performance; Competitive Advantage;

  Citation:

  Collis, David J., and Bharat Anand. "The Limitations of Dynamic Capabilities." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-029, September 2019.  View Details

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