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Publications
Publications
  • May 2009
  • Article
  • Journal of Financial Economics

Asymmetric Information Effects on Loan Spreads

By: Victoria Ivashina
  • Format:Print
  • | Pages:20
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Abstract

The paper estimates the cost arising from information asymmetry between the lead bank and members of the lending syndicate. In a lending syndicate, the lead bank retains only a fraction of the loan but acts as the intermediary between the borrower and the syndicate participants. Theory predicts that private information in the hands of the lead bank will cause syndicate participants to demand a higher interest rate and that a large loan ownership by the lead bank should reduce asymmetric information and the related premium. Nevertheless, the estimated OLS relation between the loan spread and the lead bank's share is positive. This result, however, ignores the fact that we only observe equilibrium outcomes and, therefore, the asymmetric information premium demanded by participants is offset by the diversification premium demanded by the lead bank. Using exogenous shifts in the credit risk of the lead bank's loan portfolio as an instrument, I measure the asymmetric information effect of the lead's share on the loan spread and find that it has a large economic cost, accounting for approximately 4 percent of the total cost of credit.

Keywords

Cost; Banks and Banking; Financing and Loans; Interest Rates; Capital; Investment Portfolio; Credit; Diversification; Risk and Uncertainty

Citation

Ivashina, Victoria. "Asymmetric Information Effects on Loan Spreads." Journal of Financial Economics 92, no. 2 (May 2009): 300–319.
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About The Author

Victoria Ivashina

Finance
→More Publications

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More from the Author
  • Weak Corporate Insolvency Rules: The Missing Driver of Zombie Lending By: Bo Becker and Victoria Ivashina
  • High-Yield Debt Covenants and Their Real Effects By: Falk Bräuning, Victoria Ivashina and Ali Ozdagli
  • Loan Types and the Bank Lending Channel By: Victoria Ivashina, Luc Laeven and Enrique Moral-Benito
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