Two Ways to Fly South: Lan Airlines and Southwest Airlines

Ramon  Casadesus-Masanell; Tarun   Khanna; Jorge   Tarzijan; Jordan   Mitchell

Case | HBS Case Collection | November 2006 (Revised March 2010)

Two Ways to Fly South: Lan Airlines and Southwest Airlines

by Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Tarun Khanna, Jorge Tarzijan and Jordan Mitchell

Abstract

To maximize their effectiveness, color cases should be printed in color. Looks at the different business models of two highly successful and profitable airlines: Chilean-based Lan Airlines and U.S.-based Southwest Airlines. Lan Airlines pursues a hub-to-spoke international full-service model where passenger and cargo operations are highly integrated. Southwest, on the other hand, is set up for a point-to-point, low-fare, "no frill's" service with a homogenous fleet. Designed for a course on the design of business models. Includes color exhibits.

Keywords: Business Model; Service Operations; Competitive Advantage; Air Transportation Industry; United States; Chile;

Format: Print

26 pages

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Citation:

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Tarun Khanna, Jorge Tarzijan, and Jordan Mitchell. "Two Ways to Fly South: Lan Airlines and Southwest Airlines." Harvard Business School Case 707-414, November 2006. (Revised March 2010.)

Founded in 2012, Jumia Nigeria, a startup effort by Germany-based Rocket Internet, aimed to become an African Amazon. The company entered the nascent market and immediately enjoyed an uptick in consumer spending fueled by the strength of Nigeria’s oil-based economy. By 2016, however, Jumia’s growth had begun to taper, hindered by plummeting oil prices, the subsequent economic downturn, and the pressure of Nigeria’s limited retail ecosystem. In addition, Jumia’s inventory-intensive retail model required significant infusions of capital that, in the face of a deteriorating economy and the company’s inability to show a profit, was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. Considering all this and looking to the success of the Amazon and Alibaba marketplace models where third-party sellers largely carried inventory costs, the Board had made a drastic decision: Jumia would shift from an online retail model to a marketplace model. They also made it very clear that a failure to properly implement this transition could mean the end of investor support for Jumia. Senior management wondered how they would meet the challenges ahead. While Amazon in the U.S. and Alibaba in China had found success with the marketplace model, they wondered if Jumia would be able to do the same. Was this the right model for the very different Nigerian environment? Would vendors, many of whom already had retail operations in the country, choose to sell through Jumia? How could Jumia continue to provide the same high quality customer service on which the company’s success had been built while switching to a marketplace model in which parts of this critical aspect would now be in the hands of third parties?

Teaching Note | HBS Case Collection | January 2018 (Revised April 2018)

Jumia Nigeria: from Retail to Marketplace (A) and (B)

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Karen Elterman

Founded in 2012, Jumia Nigeria, a startup effort by Germany-based Rocket Internet, aimed to become an African Amazon. The company entered the nascent market and immediately enjoyed an uptick in consumer spending fueled by the strength of Nigeria’s oil-based economy. By 2016, however, Jumia’s growth had begun to taper, hindered by plummeting oil prices, the subsequent economic downturn, and the pressure of Nigeria’s limited retail ecosystem. In addition, Jumia’s inventory-intensive retail model required significant infusions of capital that, in the face of a deteriorating economy and the company’s inability to show a profit, was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. Considering all this and looking to the success of the Amazon and Alibaba marketplace models where third-party sellers largely carried inventory costs, the Board had made a drastic decision: Jumia would shift from an online retail model to a marketplace model. They also made it very clear that a failure to properly implement this transition could mean the end of investor support for Jumia. Senior management wondered how they would meet the challenges ahead. While Amazon in the US and Alibaba in China had found success with the marketplace model, they wondered if Jumia would be able to do the same. Was this the right model for the very different Nigerian environment? Would vendors, many of whom already had retail operations in the country, choose to sell through Jumia? How could Jumia continue to provide the same high quality customer service on which the company’s success had been built while switching to a marketplace model in which parts of this critical aspect would now be in the hands of third parties? Teaching Note for HBS Nos. 718-401 and 718-432.

Keywords: globalization; Expansion; retail; marketplace; Inventory; Nigeria; Africa; ecommerce; competition; funding; Logistics; Competition; Business Model; Globalization; Emerging Markets; Expansion; Logistics; Retail Industry; India; Nigeria; Africa;

Citation:

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Karen Elterman. "Jumia Nigeria: from Retail to Marketplace (A) and (B)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 718-467, January 2018. (Revised April 2018.) View Details

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This case explores the strategic decision-making process of premium power tools manufacturer Hilti in 1999, when the company was considering implementing a fleet management system in the construction industry. Fleet management would involve a shift from selling power tools to leasing them as a service. For Hilti, it represented an entirely new business model, which would substantially differentiate the company from its competitors. While fleet management had the potential to significantly improve the customer experience, Hilti was already a successful firm under its extant model and had to decide whether the restructuring of its business model was worth the risk.

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Two Ways to Fly South: Lan Airlines and Southwest Airlines

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