Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching

A. E. Roth

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Article | Econometrica | January 1984

Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching

by A. E. Roth

Keywords: Employment;

Format: Print

11 pages

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Citation:

Roth, A. E. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching." Econometrica 52, no. 1 (January 1984): 47–57.

About the Author

Alvin E. Roth

George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Emeritus

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Working Paper | 2017

Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth and Oliver Tercieux

In 2012, New Orleans Recovery School District (RSD) became the first U.S. district to unify charter and traditional public school admissions in a single-offer assignment mechanism known as OneApp. The RSD also became the first district to use a mechanism based on Top Trading Cycles (TTC) in a real-life allocation problem. Since TTC was originally devised for settings in which agents have endowments, there is no formal rationale for TTC in school choice. In particular, TTC is a Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, but so are other mechanisms. We show that TTC is constrained-optimal in the following sense: TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms when each school has one seat. When schools have more than one seat, there are multiple possible implementations of TTC. Data from New Orleans and Boston indicate that there is little difference across these versions of TTC but significantly less justified envy compared to a serial dictatorship.

Keywords: Education; Decision Choices and Conditions; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods; Design;

Citation:
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Oliver Tercieux. "Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 23265, March 2017. View Details

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Chapter | Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology | 2015

Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?

Alvin E. Roth

The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the field several decades ago, when it and we were younger. So it will help to begin by reconstructing what some of those anticipations were.

Keywords: Economics; History; Science;

Citation:
Roth, Alvin E. "Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?" Chap. 1 in Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology, edited by Guillaume R. Frechette and Andrew Schotter, 13–42. Oxford University Press, 2015. View Details

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Working Paper | 2014

College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea

Christopher Avery, Alvin E. Roth and Soohyung Lee

This paper examines non-price competition among colleges to attract highly qualified students, exploiting the South Korean setting where the national government sets rules governing applications. We identify some basic facts about the behavior of colleges before and after a 1994 policy change that changed the timing of the national college entrance exam and introduced early admissions, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches those facts. When applications reveal information about students that is of common interest to all colleges, lower-ranked colleges can gain in competition with higher-ranked colleges by limiting the number of possible applications.

Keywords: Competition; Higher Education; Policy; Government and Politics; Education Industry; South Korea;

Citation:
Avery, Christopher, Alvin E. Roth, and Soohyung Lee. "College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 20774, December 2014. View Details

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Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching

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