JCDecaux

John R. Wells; Vincent  Dessain

Case | HBS Case Collection | February 2005 (Revised June 2006)

JCDecaux

by John R. Wells and Vincent Dessain

Abstract

Describes how JCDecaux, the second largest global outdoor advertising company, became the world leader in street furniture advertising in a fast consolidating business environment. Also explains why, in the late 1990s, JCDecaux diversified its activities into billboards and transport outdoor advertising in reaction to competitor attacks. Places students in the position of Jean-Francois Decaux and his brother Jean-Charles Decaux, the sons of the founder and JC Decaux's co-CEOs who, in late 2004, explore ways to continue the success of the 73% family-owned business.

Keywords: Advertising; Global Strategy; Leadership Style; Family Ownership; Strategic Planning; Competitive Strategy; Diversification; Advertising Industry;

Language: English

Format: Print

32 pages

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Citation:

Wells, John R., and Vincent Dessain. "JCDecaux." Harvard Business School Case 705-458, February 2005. (Revised June 2006.)

Related Work

Supplement | HBS Case Collection | February 2017

JCDecaux, 2016: Global Leader ... Again

John R. Wells and Gabriel Ellsworth

In 2016, JCDecaux was number one in the world in outdoor advertising. This was a far cry from the situation in 2003; at that time, JCDecaux had been unseated by Clear Channel from the number-one spot that it had held for decades, and it was fighting for second place with OUTFRONT (then owned by Viacom). Over the 12 intervening years, JCDecaux had doubled in size, building leadership positions in China, Japan, Latin America, Africa, and Russia, and in 2010, it had passed Clear Channel to lead the industry once more. Now, co-CEOs Jean-François Decaux and Jean-Charles Decaux were looking for new ways and new places to grow. After the company overtook Clear Channel in 2010, Jean-François had indicated that he believed that another doubling in size was feasible, but it would probably take a major acquisition to do so. And JCDecaux faced more pressing short-term issues. The contract for London bus shelters that the company had won with much fanfare in August 2015 was behind schedule. To make matters worse, the United Kingdom’s June 2016 “Brexit” vote to leave the European Union cast a shadow over the project, and the markets reacted negatively. By the start of November, JCDecaux’s share price had fallen 21% since the beginning of the year. Just what the economic uncertainty of Brexit would mean for global outdoor advertising in general, and U.K. outdoor advertising in particular, was not clear. Doubling in size in such an environment appeared a daunting task.

Keywords: JCDecaux; Clear Channel Outdoor; OUTFRONT Media; Lamar Advertising Company; Jean-François Decaux; Jean-Charles Decaux; outdoor advertising; street furniture; airports; billboards; bicycles; digital devices; digital marketing; bidding; Advertising; Advertising Campaigns; Acquisition; Mergers and Acquisitions; Business Growth and Maturation; Business Model; Business Organization; Family Business; For-Profit Firms; Joint Ventures; Design; Price; Profit; Revenue; Geographic Location; Geographic Scope; Global Range; Globalization; Global Strategy; Globalized Firms and Management; Multinational Firms and Management; Globalized Markets and Industries; Government Legislation; Business History; Human Resources; Laws and Statutes; Business or Company Management; Goals and Objectives; Growth and Development Strategy; Growth Management; Marketing; Brands and Branding; Marketing Channels; Marketing Strategy; Product Marketing; Demand and Consumers; Supply and Industry; Operations; Distribution; Infrastructure; Logistics; Product; Product Design; Production; Organizational Structure; Property; Public Ownership; Renting or Rental; Problems and Challenges; Business and Community Relations; Business and Government Relations; Family and Family Relationships; Sales; Situation or Environment; Luxury; Strategy; Business Strategy; Commercialization; Competition; Competitive Advantage; Competitive Strategy; Consolidation; Corporate Strategy; Customization and Personalization; Expansion; Segmentation; Mobile Technology; Wireless Technology; Air Transportation; Bicycle Transportation; Rail Transportation; Transportation Networks; Advertising Industry; France; Paris;

Citation:
Wells, John R., and Gabriel Ellsworth. "JCDecaux, 2016: Global Leader ... Again." Harvard Business School Supplement 717-441, February 2017. View Details

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Case | HBS Case Collection | February 2005 (Revised June 2006)

JCDecaux

John R. Wells and Vincent Dessain

Describes how JCDecaux, the second largest global outdoor advertising company, became the world leader in street furniture advertising in a fast consolidating business environment. Also explains why, in the late 1990s, JCDecaux diversified its activities into billboards and transport outdoor advertising in reaction to competitor attacks. Places students in the position of Jean-Francois Decaux and his brother Jean-Charles Decaux, the sons of the founder and JC Decaux's co-CEOs who, in late 2004, explore ways to continue the success of the 73% family-owned business.

Keywords: Advertising; Global Strategy; Leadership Style; Family Ownership; Strategic Planning; Competitive Strategy; Diversification; Advertising Industry;

Citation:
Wells, John R., and Vincent Dessain. "JCDecaux." Harvard Business School Case 705-458, February 2005. (Revised June 2006.) View Details

Cite View Details Educators Purchase Related

Case | HBS Case Collection | May 2019

State of Charge: The Massachusetts Energy Storage Initiative

John R. Wells and Benjamin Weinstock

In early 2017, Judith Judson (Harvard Business School MBA, 2000), Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources (DOER), was reflecting on the results of the initiative she had led to identify the contribution advanced electricity storage could make to electricity generation and distribution in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The study was the first major output from the $10 million Energy Storage Initiative (ESI) launched by Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker’s administration in May 2015. The advanced simulation techniques employed in the study indicated that over a ten-year period, the optimal deployment of storage capacity would cut the cost of electricity for consumers in the Commonwealth by $230 million per year, deliver $110 million in annual revenues for storage providers, and reduce CO2 emissions by 100,000 tons a year, the equivalent of taking 22,000 cars off the road. Moreover, neighboring states would benefit from $250 million in lowered wholesale prices. To deliver these benefits, 1.77 GWh of advanced storage would be required across the grid, costing between $970 million and $1.35 billion. Incorporating the perspectives of a wide body of stakeholders (from utilities to municipalities to generators), the study wound up recommending a suite of policies that would facilitate the installation of 600 MWh of storage capacity by 2025, representing about six minutes of the state’s daily electricity consumption and delivering $800 million in benefits to ratepayers. It would also make the Commonwealth a leader in advanced storage technology and deliver substantial greenhouse gas reductions. At the end of 2015, according to figures from the Department of Energy, Massachusetts ranked 23rd in the United States in energy storage deployment, well behind the leader, Arizona, with nearly 300 MWh, and Texas, with over 150 MWh. However, with advances in storage technology, California promised to become the leader and had plans for nearly 1 GWh of storage capacity over the next five years. The ESI was seeking input on how to spend the balance of its $10 million budget and whether to authorize an additional $10 million on proof-of-concept deployments of the technology. Commissioner Judson pondered. Was this aggressive enough? And where did advanced storage stand in the priorities for the energy future of the Commonwealth?

Keywords: energy storage; Energy Generation; Programs; Policy; Strategy; Energy Industry; Utilities Industry; Massachusetts;

Citation:

Wells, John R., and Benjamin Weinstock. "State of Charge: The Massachusetts Energy Storage Initiative." Harvard Business School Case 719-448, May 2019. View Details

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Electric cars had long been championed by environmentalists as a superior solution to the internal combustion engine (ICE), but, despite large government incentives and strong pioneering efforts by a few automakers over the years, electric and hybrid cars and light trucks still accounted for less than 1% of total global production in 2016. However, events took a turn in 2017 and 2018, when many governments committed to banning ICE vehicles. In response, leading automakers announced plans to launch hundreds of electric vehicle models within five years. Early pioneer Tesla, which, in 2017, had built a stock market valuation exceeding that of General Motors (GM), despite only delivering 103,000 cars compared to GM’s 9 million, looked as if it were about to be engulfed by this new competition. But not all were convinced that electric cars would soon displace conventional ICE vehicles. It was not clear that the infrastructure was in place to charge all these electric vehicles. There were also questions concerning the electrical generating capacity to meet the new demand. Would battery prices fall enough to make mass-market demand a possibility? In low gasoline cost jurisdictions, such as the United States, the economics of owning an electric vehicle didn’t appear justified, unless subsidies were maintained indefinitely. In Europe, where gasoline taxes were high, the case for electric vehicles was stronger. But European governments depended on those taxes to meet their budget needs. Would a significant uptake of electric vehicles necessitate higher taxes on electricity? In 2018, electric cars were an expensive novelty for the rich subsidized by the poor. Would the sudden rush of new models change the balance?

On January 6, 2019, HelloSelf, a London-based “BrainTech” company, founded a year earlier by Charles Wells, soft launched. The proposition was simply to help its members “Be your Best Self.” The company provided its registered members with access to a clinical psychotherapist, a life coach, and an AI engine that personalized advice. The platform provided members with the ability to set goals, track progress, and discover new things about themselves. Throughout the previous nine months, over 500 people had registered interest in the proposition, price points had been tested, competitors analyzed, members and specialists interviewed, and wireframes developed, but there were several questions still crossing Wells’ mind. Did the subscription LifeCoach bot model combined with pay-as-you-go therapist sessions make sense? How could he attract an early cohort of users? How would HelloSelf interact with the broken mental health solutions in the UK? How quickly would the platform scale and learn to provide meaningful AI support for both therapists and the LifeCoach bot? And most importantly, would the platform deliver on the mission “to help everyone discover, understand and experience their Best Self”?

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