Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Faculty & Research
  • Faculty
  • Research
  • Featured Topics
  • Academic Units
  • …→
  • Harvard Business School→
  • Faculty & Research→
Publications
Publications
  • 2007
  • Working Paper

The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices

By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
  • Format:Print
  • | Language:English
ShareBar

Abstract

New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating, and when it was not. After the GI match ended, programs hired fellows earlier each year, eventually almost a year earlier than when the match was operating. It became customary for GI program directors to make very short offers, rarely exceeding two weeks and often much shorter. Consequently many potential fellows had to accept positions before they finished their planned interviews, and most programs experienced cancellations of interviews they had scheduled. Furthermore, without a match, many programs hired more local fellows, and fewer from other hospitals and cities than they did during the match. Wages, however, seem not to have been affected. To restart the match, we proposed a policy, subsequently adopted by the gastroenterology professional organizations, that even if applicants had accepted offers prior to the match, they could subsequently decline those offers and participate in the match. This made it safe for programs to delay hiring until the match, confident that programs that did not participate would not be able to "capture" the most desirable candidates beforehand. Consequently it appears that most programs waited for the match in an orderly way in 2006, when the GI match was reinstated. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely.

Keywords

Health; Employment; Marketplace Matching; Selection and Staffing; Job Offer; Compensation and Benefits; Health Industry

Citation

Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 13529, October 2007.
  • Read Now

About The Author

Alvin E. Roth

→More Publications

More from the Authors

    • September 2021
    • Management Science

    Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective

    By: Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth
    • 2021
    • Faculty Research

    Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective

    By: Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth
    • July 2018
    • American Economic Review

    Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design

    By: Alvin E. Roth
More from the Authors
  • Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective By: Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth
  • Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective By: Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth
  • Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design By: Alvin E. Roth
ǁ
Campus Map
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
→Map & Directions
→More Contact Information
  • Make a Gift
  • Site Map
  • Jobs
  • Harvard University
  • Trademarks
  • Policies
  • Accessibility
  • Digital Accessibility
Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College