Publications
Publications
- September 2007
- Journal of Economic History
Related Lending and Economic Performance: Evidence from Mexico
By: Noel Maurer and Stephen Haber
Abstract
Related lending, a widespread practice in LDCs, is widely held to encourage bankers to loot their banks at the expense of minority shareholders and depositors. We argue that neither looting nor credit misallocation are necessary outcomes of related lending. On the contrary, related lending often exists as a response to high information and contract enforcement costs. Whether it encourages looting depends on other institutions, particularly those that create incentives to monitor directors. We examine Mexico's banking system, 1888–1913, in which there was widespread related lending. We find little evidence of credit misallocation despite a financial crisis and government-organized rescue.
Keywords
Crime and Corruption; Developing Countries and Economies; Financial Crisis; Financing and Loans; History; Business and Shareholder Relations; Banking Industry; Mexico
Citation
Maurer, Noel, and Stephen Haber. "Related Lending and Economic Performance: Evidence from Mexico." Journal of Economic History 67, no. 3 (September 2007): 551–581.