PepsiCo's Bid for Quaker Oats (A)

Carliss Y. Baldwin; Leonid P Sudakov

Case | HBS Case Collection | June 2001 (Revised September 2011)

PepsiCo's Bid for Quaker Oats (A)

by Carliss Y. Baldwin and Leonid P Sudakov

Abstract

Throughout 1999, PepsiCo closely tracked several potential strategic acquisitions. In the fall of 2000, it appeared that the right moment for an equity-financed acquisition had arrived. At this time, PepsiCo management decided to initiate confidential discussions with The Quaker Oats Co. about a potential business combination. Gatorade, a key brand in Quaker's portfolio, had long been on PepsiCo's wish list, but PepsiCo's managers, led by CEO Roger Enrico and CFO Indra Nooyi, were committed to upholding the value of PepsiCo's shares and, as a result, were determined not to pay too much for Quaker. This case provides information that allows students: to assess the value of Quaker's businesses, estimate potential synergies associated with a Pepsi-Quaker merger, and come up with an effective negotiation strategy.

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Private Equity; Stock Shares; Negotiation; Strategy; Valuation; Food and Beverage Industry;

Format: Print

25 pages

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Citation:

Baldwin, Carliss Y., and Leonid P Sudakov. "PepsiCo's Bid for Quaker Oats (A)." Harvard Business School Case 801-458, June 2001. (Revised September 2011.)

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PepsiCo's Bid for Quaker Oats (A)

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