Microsoft CarPoint

Case | HBS Case Collection | June 1998 (Revised August 2000)

Microsoft CarPoint

Abstract

CarPoint.com was Microsoft's Web-based entry into on-line automobile retailing. While it could not, in fact, "sell" or deliver any cars, it could shift much of consumer search, comparison, and decision-making, including pricing, the traditional car dealer to the Web. This shift in buying behavior from marketplace to marketspace was significant in its implications for consumers and dealers, CarPoint and its competitor firms face a double challenge in creating effective e-commerce businesses and in influencing their channel partners to provide effective service experiences. CarPoint, however, was a late entrant, and it faced competition from category first-movers AutoByTel.com, AutoWeb.com, and AutoVantage.com. As a result, the case deals with larger issues of channel and consumer behavior change as well as tactical issues pertaining to competitive positioning in a competitive market both on-line and off-line.

Keywords: Internet; Service Operations; Market Entry and Exit; Consumer Behavior; Auto Industry; Retail Industry;

Format: Print

32 pages

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Citation:

Rayport, Jeffrey F., Avnish S. Bajaj, Steffan Haithcox, and Michael V. Kadyan. "Microsoft CarPoint." Harvard Business School Case 898-280, June 1998. (Revised August 2000.)

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Microsoft CarPoint

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