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  • RAND Journal of Economics

On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation

By: Jerry R. Green and Suzanne Scotchmer
  • Format:Print
  • | Pages:14
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Abstract

In markets with sequential innovation, inventors of derivative improvements might undermine the profit of initial innovators through competition. Profit erosion can be mitigated by broadening the first innovator's patent protection and/or by permitting cooperative agreements between initial innovators and later innovators. We investigate the policy that is most effective at ensuring the first innovator earns a large share of profit from the second-generation products it facilitates. In general, not all the profit can be transferred to the first innovator, and therefore patents shold last lognger when a sequence of innovations is undertaken by different firms rather than being concentrated in one firm.

Keywords

Profit; Innovation and Invention

Citation

Green, Jerry R., and Suzanne Scotchmer. "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation." RAND Journal of Economics 26, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 20–33.
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About The Author

Jerry R. Green

Negotiation, Organizations & Markets
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More from the Authors
  • Assent-maximizing Social Choice By: Katherine A. Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
  • Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
  • Choice-based Measures of Conflict in Preferences By: Katherine Baldiga and Jerry R. Green
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