Newell Company: Corporate Strategy

Cynthia A. Montgomery; Elizabeth  Gordon

Case | HBS Case Collection | March 1999 (Revised January 2005)

Newell Company: Corporate Strategy

by Cynthia A. Montgomery and Elizabeth Gordon

Abstract

In 1998, Newell Co., a manufacturer of low-tech, high-volume consumer goods, acquired Calphalon Corp., a high-end cookware company, and Rubbermaid, a $2 billion manufacturer of consumer and commercial plastic products. The case focuses on Newell's strategy and its elaboration throughout the organization, as well as the importance of selecting appropriate acquisitions to grow the company. Do Calphalon and Rubbermaid fit with the company's long-term strategy of growth through acquisition and superior service to volume customers? A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Customer Focus and Relationships; Customer Satisfaction; Business or Company Management; Goals and Objectives; Growth and Development Strategy; Strategy; Competitive Strategy; Corporate Strategy; Consumer Products Industry;

Format: Print

22 pages

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Citation:

Montgomery, Cynthia A., and Elizabeth Gordon. "Newell Company: Corporate Strategy." Harvard Business School Case 799-139, March 1999. (Revised January 2005.)

Using a novel dataset that comprehensively classifies the quantitative financial disclosures in firms' 10-Ks, including those hidden in the footnotes and the MD&A, we show that disclosures of non-operating and less persistent income-statement items are both frequent and economically significant, and increasingly so over time. Adjusting GAAP earnings to exclude these items creates a measure of core earnings that is highly persistent and that forecasts future performance. Street earnings for firms that meet or just beat analyst expectations are more likely to selectively exclude these items. Analysts and market participants also are slow to impound the implications of these items. Trading strategies that exploit cross-sectional differences in firms' transitory earnings produce abnormal returns of 7% to 10% per year.

Case | HBS Case Collection | March 2018 (Revised September 2019)

China Vanke: Battle for Control (A)

Lynn S. Paine, Charles C.Y. Wang, Dawn H. Lau and Anthony K. Woo

In June 2016, the board of China Vanke, one of China’s largest and best-known private residential real estate developers, must vote on a proposed acquisition that is opposed by its largest shareholders, state-owned China Resources Co. and the lesser-known property developer and financial services company Baoneng. The case describes how Baoneng amassed enough shares in Vanke to become its largest shareholder, displacing China Resources in that position. In response to Baoneng’s unwelcome advance and in support of its “railway plus property” strategy, Vanke’s management has proposed the acquisition of a unit of Shenzhen Metro, the government-owned operator of Shenzhen’s underground subway. The proposed acquisition, to be financed by issuing shares, will make Shenzhen Metro Vanke’s largest shareholder and dilute the holdings of both China Resources and Baoneng. China Resources has publicly expressed misgivings about the transaction and the board’s handling of its announcement. With three out of the 11 board seats occupied by China Resources affiliates, and a two-thirds majority needed for the proposal to pass, the vote would determine the future of Vanke.

Keywords: China Vanke; China Resources; Hostile takeover; board of directors; shareholding structure; shareholder rights; asset restructuring; Corporate Governance; Governing and Advisory Boards; Valuation; Business and Shareholder Relations; Real Estate Industry; China;

Citation:

Paine, Lynn S., Charles C.Y. Wang, Dawn H. Lau, and Anthony K. Woo. "China Vanke: Battle for Control (A)." Harvard Business School Case 318-117, March 2018. (Revised September 2019.) View Details

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This case centers around Qualcomm shareholders' 2012 Say-on-Pay vote and the dispute between the Institutional Shareholder Services and management regarding the appropriateness of the CEO's compensation plan. Was ISS right that Qualcomm's CEO's pay was inflated and justified by benchmarking to aspirational peers? Or was management correct that its CEO's pay is warranted by Qualcomm's recent firm performance?

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Newell Company: Corporate Strategy

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