Newell Company: Corporate Strategy

Cynthia A. Montgomery; Elizabeth  Gordon

Case | HBS Case Collection | March 1999 (Revised January 2005)

Newell Company: Corporate Strategy

by Cynthia A. Montgomery and Elizabeth Gordon

Abstract

In 1998, Newell Co., a manufacturer of low-tech, high-volume consumer goods, acquired Calphalon Corp., a high-end cookware company, and Rubbermaid, a $2 billion manufacturer of consumer and commercial plastic products. The case focuses on Newell's strategy and its elaboration throughout the organization, as well as the importance of selecting appropriate acquisitions to grow the company. Do Calphalon and Rubbermaid fit with the company's long-term strategy of growth through acquisition and superior service to volume customers? A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Customer Focus and Relationships; Customer Satisfaction; Business or Company Management; Goals and Objectives; Growth and Development Strategy; Strategy; Competitive Strategy; Corporate Strategy; Consumer Products Industry;

Format: Print

22 pages

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Citation:

Montgomery, Cynthia A., and Elizabeth Gordon. "Newell Company: Corporate Strategy." Harvard Business School Case 799-139, March 1999. (Revised January 2005.)

The case describes the investment of hedge fund, Totem Point Management in Analog Semiconductors (ADI) as a way to discuss forecasting and valuation in growth companies. In June 2016, hedge fund Totem Point invested in ADI at around $55 a share. In general, Totem Point aimed for their investments to yield 50% returns over a two-year time horizon. It was now 2018, and Totem Point was evaluating whether to maintain its position in ADI, expand it, or close it and walk away with its (substantial) winnings from the investment. Though the stock had done well in the prior two years, it had recently seen numerous downgrades by sell-side analysts, as its price slid 15% from a historic high. The question facing Totem Point, was whether it would grow by a further 50% over the next two years. To answer this question, Totem Point considered growth trends in each of ADI’s main end-markets: industrial applications, consumer applications, automotive applications, and telecommunications applications. If these end-markets expanded over the coming two years, ADI would do very well, but if they failed to expand, the stock would stagnate. Totem Point’s task was to figure out which scenario was most likely and what that scenario would mean for the stock’s price.

Relative total shareholder returns (rTSR) has become the predominant metric to isolate managers' idiosyncratic performance. Among firms that explicitly use rTSR in relative performance contracts, 60%—those that choose specific peers as benchmarks—select rTSR metrics that do a remarkable job of filtering out the systematic component of returns in adherence to the informativeness principle. However, firms that choose index-based benchmarks retain substantial systematic noise in their rTSR metrics. We document that the selection of noisy benchmarks is associated with compensation consultants' preferences, which are uncorrelated with observable firm attributes. Firms with weak governance are more likely to choose indexes, not because of opportunism, but because they do not adequately scrutinize outside experts' advice. Collectively, our findings provide a new explanation for why some executives are evaluated based on systematic noise and novel evidence on how compensation consultants can impact firms.

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Newell Company: Corporate Strategy

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