PepsiCo's Restaurants

Cynthia A. Montgomery

Case | HBS Case Collection | January 1994 (Revised February 2001)

PepsiCo's Restaurants

Abstract

In 1992 PepsiCo is considering two opportunities to expand its restaurant business, Carts of Colorado, a $7 million manufacturer and merchandiser of mobile food carts, and California Pizza Kitchen, a $60 million chain in the casual dining segment. The discussion focuses on whether PepsiCo should pursue these opportunities, and if so, how the relationships might be structured, given PepsiCo's large organization and decentralized management structure. Examines strategy formulation and coordination issues in a related set of businesses that are part of a large, decentralized consumer products company.

Keywords: Management Systems; Organizational Structure; Opportunities; Business Strategy; Expansion; Food and Beverage Industry;

Language: English

Format: Print

26 pages

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Citation:

Montgomery, Cynthia A. "PepsiCo's Restaurants." Harvard Business School Case 794-078, January 1994. (Revised February 2001.)

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PepsiCo's Restaurants

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