A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know

David A. Moss

Book | 2007

A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know

Abstract

Now more than ever before, executives and managers need to understand their larger economic context. In The Concise Guide to Macroeconomics, David Moss leverages his many years of teaching experience at Harvard Business School to lay out important macroeconomic concepts in engaging, clear, and concise terms. In a simple and intuitive way, he breaks down the ideas into "output," "money," and "expectations." In addition, Moss introduces powerful tools for interpreting the big-picture economic developments that shape events in the contemporary business arena. Detailed examples are also drawn from history to illuminate important concepts. This book is destined to become a staple in MBA courses--as well as the go-to resource for executives and managers at all levels seeking to brush up on their knowledge of macroeconomic dynamics.

Keywords: Macroeconomics; Money; Investment; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques;

Format: Print

Find at Harvard

Citation:

Moss, David A. A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2007.

Case | HBS Case Collection | December 2010 (Revised June 2018)

The Pecora Hearings

David Moss, Cole Bolton and Eugene Kintgen

In 1932, in the depths of the Great Depression, the Senate Banking Committee began a much-publicized investigation of the nation's financial sector. The hearings, which came to be known as the Pecora hearings after the Banking Committee's lead counsel Ferdinand Pecora, revealed how the country's most respected financial institutions knowingly misled investors as to the desirability of certain securities, engaged in irresponsible investment behavior, and offered privileges to insiders not afforded to ordinary investors. During the famous “Hundred Day” congressional session that began his presidency, Roosevelt signed two bills meant to prevent some of these abuses, but he also believed that the government should play a more active role in the financial system by regulating national securities exchanges. In February 1934, the president urged Congress to enact such legislation, prompting the introduction of a bill entitled the Securities Exchange Act, which would force all securities exchanges to register with the Federal Trade Commission, would curtail the size of loans that could be advanced to securities investors, and would ban a number of practices (such as short-selling) that were thought to facilitate stock manipulation. Additionally, the legislation would require that all companies with exchange-listed securities publish detailed business reports as frequently as the FTC desired. Wall Street, represented in particular by New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) President Richard Whitney, took a strong position against the Securities Exchange Act. Whitney was ultimately summoned to testify during the congressional hearings on the Securities Exchange Act in late February 1934. Would he be able to convince lawmakers to take a different course, or would his arguments fail to win over those who believed that strict regulations were exactly what financial markets required following the Great Crash?

Keywords: Financial Crisis; Fairness; Borrowing and Debt; Financial Institutions; Debt Securities; Stocks; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Government Legislation; History; Financial Services Industry; United States;

Citation:

Moss, David, Cole Bolton, and Eugene Kintgen. "The Pecora Hearings." Harvard Business School Case 711-046, December 2010. (Revised June 2018.) View Details

Cite View Details Educators Purchase

In late October 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt felt relieved after months of anxiety and uncertainty. Workers in Pennsylvania's anthracite coal industry had been on strike for five months, threatening to leave eastern cities in the cold without enough heating fuel for the winter. Anthracite workers and business owners had finally reached an agreement after months of stalemate, and anthracite production resumed on October 23. The agreement—the first of its kind—put decision-making power in the hands of a federal commission, appointed by the president and empowered to determine terms of employment and various operational questions in the anthracite region. After a week-long investigation in the mines, the commission began hearing testimony from hundreds of representatives of the workers and their employers, the mine operators. The hearings finally closed in February 1903, after which the commission began formulating its final judgments. Members of the commission knew that their work would set an important precedent for industrial governance in the years ahead. Past U.S. presidents had helped put down strikes that threatened federal property or public safety, but the anthracite strike of 1902 marked the first time the government acted to resolve a strike both without force and without such a clear legal justification. The decisions of the commission would therefore have important ramifications not only for the anthracite industry, but potentially for American business–labor relations more generally. With copious amounts of data, testimony, and research to inform them, the commission members began the process of deciding how an American industry should, and would, operate.

On Election Day in 1918, Massachusetts voters would have to decide not only on their preferred candidates for governor and U.S. Senator, but also whether or not to approve 19 proposed amendments to the state constitution. By far the most controversial of these would establish a state process of initiative and referendum. The initiative would empower private citizens to write both laws and constitutional amendments, and pass them, even over the opposition of a majority of the state legislature. The referendum would allow voters to rescind laws that the legislature had passed. Behind this proposed amendment lay nearly three decades of agitation, both in the state and nationally, for “direct democracy” in America.
The initiative and referendum—or “I&R” for short—had become a key demand of progressivism, the diverse movement for economic, social, and political reform that swept the nation for nearly two decades after 1900. By 1918, 19 states, mostly in the West, and hundreds of counties and municipalities, including a number of cities in Massachusetts, had adopted some form of I&R. Opposition to a statewide I&R provision in Massachusetts, however, remained fierce. Opponents claimed it would threaten the rights of minorities, give undue influence to small but well organized interest groups, and place needless burdens on voters. Proponents urged the people to empower themselves and take back control of the state from the “invisible government” of party bosses and corporate lobbyists. Now, with the election approaching, Massachusetts voters would have to decide.

Faculty & Research

A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know

Abstract

Citation:

About the Author

More from the Author